feat: implement concord protocol (#49)

Only backend, no UI yet.

Reviewed-on: #49

crates/concord/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+[package]
+name = "concord"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+publish.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+nostr.workspace = true
+nostr-sdk.workspace = true
+
+hkdf.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+chacha20.workspace = true
+hmac.workspace = true
+data-encoding.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+nostr-memory.workspace = true
+smol.workspace = true

crates/concord/src/derive.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+use anyhow::{Result, bail};
+use hkdf::Hkdf;
+use nostr::nips::nip44::v2::ConversationKey;
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::{Keys, PublicKey, SecretKey};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::{ChannelId, CommunityId, Epoch};
+
+pub const TOKEN_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+const LABEL_CHANNEL: &str = "concord/channel";
+const LABEL_CONTROL: &str = "concord/control";
+const LABEL_CONTROL_SIGNER: &str = "concord/control-signer";
+const LABEL_REKEY_PSEUDONYM: &str = "concord/rekey-pseudonym";
+const LABEL_BASE_REKEY_PSEUDONYM: &str = "concord/base-rekey-pseudonym";
+const LABEL_RECIPIENT_PSEUDONYM: &str = "concord/recipient-pseudonym";
+const LABEL_GUESTBOOK: &str = "concord/guestbook";
+const LABEL_DISSOLVED: &str = "concord/dissolved";
+const LABEL_GRANT: &str = "concord/grant";
+const LABEL_BANLIST: &str = "concord/banlist";
+const LABEL_PINS: &str = "concord/pins";
+const LABEL_INVITE_LINKS: &str = "concord/invite-links";
+const LABEL_INVITE_KEY: &str = "concord/invite-key";
+
+const LABEL_COMMUNITY: &str = "concord/community";
+const LABEL_EPOCH_COMMITMENT: &str = "concord/epoch-key-commitment";
+
+const ZERO32: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
+
+fn build_info(label: &str, id32: &[u8; 32], epoch: Option<u64>) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut info = Vec::with_capacity(label.len() + 1 + 32 + 8);
+    info.extend_from_slice(label.as_bytes());
+    info.push(0x00);
+    info.extend_from_slice(id32);
+
+    if let Some(epoch) = epoch {
+        info.extend_from_slice(&epoch.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+
+    info
+}
+
+fn hkdf32(ikm: &[u8], info: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut okm = [0u8; 32];
+    Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, ikm)
+        .expand(info, &mut okm)
+        .expect("expanding HKDF to 32 bytes is below the 255*32 ceiling");
+    okm
+}
+
+fn hkdf_to_secret_key(ikm: &[u8], base_info: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretKey> {
+    if let Ok(secret_key) = SecretKey::from_slice(&hkdf32(ikm, base_info)) {
+        return Ok(secret_key);
+    }
+
+    for counter in 0u8..=u8::MAX {
+        let mut info = Vec::with_capacity(base_info.len() + 1);
+        info.extend_from_slice(base_info);
+        info.push(counter);
+
+        if let Ok(secret_key) = SecretKey::from_slice(&hkdf32(ikm, &info)) {
+            return Ok(secret_key);
+        }
+    }
+
+    bail!("seed stayed out of the secp256k1 scalar range across all 256 counters")
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct GroupKey {
+    keys: Keys,
+    conversation: ConversationKey,
+}
+
+impl GroupKey {
+    fn derive(label: &str, secret: &[u8], id32: &[u8; 32], epoch: Option<u64>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let secret_key = hkdf_to_secret_key(secret, &build_info(label, id32, epoch))?;
+        let keys = Keys::new(secret_key);
+        let conversation = ConversationKey::derive(keys.secret_key(), &keys.public_key())?;
+
+        Ok(Self { keys, conversation })
+    }
+
+    pub fn pk(&self) -> PublicKey {
+        self.keys.public_key()
+    }
+
+    pub fn pk_hex(&self) -> String {
+        self.keys.public_key().to_hex()
+    }
+
+    pub fn keys(&self) -> &Keys {
+        &self.keys
+    }
+
+    pub fn conversation(&self) -> &ConversationKey {
+        &self.conversation
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for GroupKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("GroupKey")
+            .field("pk", &self.pk_hex())
+            .finish()
+    }
+}
+
+/// `secret` is the `community_root` for a public channel.
+pub fn channel_group_key(secret: &[u8; 32], channel: &ChannelId, epoch: Epoch) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(LABEL_CHANNEL, secret, channel.as_bytes(), Some(epoch.0))
+}
+
+/// The plane's read key: its conversation key encrypts the wraps for every member.
+pub fn control_group_key(
+    community_root: &[u8; 32],
+    community_id: &CommunityId,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(
+        LABEL_CONTROL,
+        community_root,
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        Some(epoch.0),
+    )
+}
+
+/// The plane's address and wrap signer, held only by staff; wraps still read under [`control_group_key`].
+pub fn control_signer_group_key(
+    control_root: &[u8; 32],
+    community_id: &CommunityId,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(
+        LABEL_CONTROL_SIGNER,
+        control_root,
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        Some(epoch.0),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Member-writable, unlike the Control Plane: a join or a leave is each member's own word.
+pub fn guestbook_group_key(
+    community_root: &[u8; 32],
+    community_id: &CommunityId,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(
+        LABEL_GUESTBOOK,
+        community_root,
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        Some(epoch.0),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Keyed by the prior `community_root`, so any retained member recovers any epoch's rekey.
+pub fn channel_rekey_group_key(
+    prior_root: &[u8; 32],
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    new_epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(
+        LABEL_REKEY_PSEUDONYM,
+        prior_root,
+        channel.as_bytes(),
+        Some(new_epoch.0),
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn base_rekey_group_key(
+    prior_root: &[u8; 32],
+    community_id: &CommunityId,
+    new_epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(
+        LABEL_BASE_REKEY_PSEUDONYM,
+        prior_root,
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        Some(new_epoch.0),
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn dissolved_group_key(community_id: &CommunityId) -> Result<GroupKey> {
+    GroupKey::derive(LABEL_DISSOLVED, community_id.as_bytes(), &ZERO32, None)
+}
+
+pub fn community_id_of(owner_xonly: &[u8; 32], owner_salt: &[u8; 32]) -> CommunityId {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(LABEL_COMMUNITY.as_bytes());
+    hasher.update(owner_xonly);
+    hasher.update(owner_salt);
+    CommunityId::from_bytes(hasher.finalize().into())
+}
+
+pub fn verify_community_id(
+    community_id: &CommunityId,
+    owner_xonly: &[u8; 32],
+    owner_salt: &[u8; 32],
+) -> bool {
+    community_id_of(owner_xonly, owner_salt) == *community_id
+}
+
+/// The continuity a rekey blob must satisfy against the key currently held.
+pub fn epoch_key_commitment(previous_epoch: Epoch, previous_key: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(LABEL_EPOCH_COMMITMENT.as_bytes());
+    hasher.update(previous_epoch.0.to_be_bytes());
+    hasher.update(previous_key);
+    hasher.finalize().into()
+}
+
+/// Bound to the `community_id`, so a member's Grant coordinate survives every refounding.
+pub fn grant_locator(community_id: &CommunityId, member_xonly: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    hkdf32(
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        &build_info(LABEL_GRANT, member_xonly, None),
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn banlist_locator(community_id: &CommunityId) -> [u8; 32] {
+    hkdf32(
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        &build_info(LABEL_BANLIST, &ZERO32, None),
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn pins_locator(community_id: &CommunityId, channel: &ChannelId) -> [u8; 32] {
+    hkdf32(
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        &build_info(LABEL_PINS, channel.as_bytes(), None),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Bound to the creator, so each creator owns exactly their own registry.
+pub fn invite_links_locator(community_id: &CommunityId, creator_xonly: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    hkdf32(
+        community_id.as_bytes(),
+        &build_info(LABEL_INVITE_LINKS, creator_xonly, None),
+    )
+}
+
+/// Built from public inputs only, so a locator match proves nothing about authenticity
+pub fn recipient_locator(
+    rotator_xonly: &[u8; 32],
+    recipient_xonly: &[u8; 32],
+    scope_id: &[u8; 32],
+    new_epoch: Epoch,
+) -> [u8; 32] {
+    let mut ikm = [0u8; 64];
+    ikm[..32].copy_from_slice(rotator_xonly);
+    ikm[32..].copy_from_slice(recipient_xonly);
+    hkdf32(
+        &ikm,
+        &build_info(LABEL_RECIPIENT_PSEUDONYM, scope_id, Some(new_epoch.0)),
+    )
+}
+
+/// The raw output is the NIP-44 conversation key (CORD-05 §2).
+pub fn invite_bundle_key(token: &[u8; TOKEN_LEN]) -> [u8; 32] {
+    hkdf32(token, &build_info(LABEL_INVITE_KEY, &ZERO32, None))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    const CHANNEL_E0_SEED: &str =
+        "1a99a5958bf9fcc5336e6e19db42aabf36ffbfa12f38a1d5fbde2ae383ed751b";
+    const CHANNEL_E0_PK: &str = "7a5c5dff759a63f1fc2779864487432bae3d1ea72c4ffabd39f4c1fdaf62097a";
+    const CHANNEL_EMULTI_PK: &str =
+        "f20c7d192cc87615d7341e86f38f85303f4708b40232d4fea521ab8217767391";
+    const CONTROL_E0_PK: &str = "c43df20bf4d6eeaea5149619662ffe9b211f31e11bb4a59f56b6e906f702d46f";
+    const CONTROL_SIGNER_E0_SEED: &str =
+        "c4a3e8354d95137132087356412b67b53e025d127d45de45cff9ecf45b0c24f6";
+    const CONTROL_SIGNER_E0_PK: &str =
+        "718aef388257f3fd9f1bfae5cf2cbd0594a2ffc31adb5c1fe22c502c046acaee";
+    const CONTROL_SIGNER_EMULTI_PK: &str =
+        "e27235cc13be2f9ad65648e01ff2b63402846469c8638b5386c625688194ec7d";
+    const GUESTBOOK_E0_PK: &str =
+        "ad09de582026fa7a052db18bb5827fa24c15e929d59aadcc91efb8508f5368ad";
+    const CHANNEL_REKEY_E1_PK: &str =
+        "7c55cdb957e9db2b4800d687b2a07d3f7066b1a35824a1e86ba871f55e87e8b5";
+    const BASE_REKEY_E1_PK: &str =
+        "fb2fa44fba66ba15595f784255a1cb569531db8784432ac0e4fe838498dd9dea";
+    const DISSOLVED_PK: &str = "4d3d55d88fdf9d9c2089651e5cbb0dfa93b6b9b10cdcb2319b0dce1a1398096a";
+    const GRANT_LOCATOR: &str = "fd2f88cc7f1eb8d7d862c91dc22afe700c358d1845158b3f353b769ce4898e35";
+    const BANLIST_LOCATOR: &str =
+        "88089214afae6d3c412fd817ada44d6df4d485a53565646471e74476397693c9";
+    const INVITE_LINKS_LOCATOR: &str =
+        "f4ae29994165767bac23e8dce630f81b926d2c8aa150e5cbf0bdf75865e8379a";
+    const RECIPIENT_LOCATOR: &str =
+        "342deb400e191f0f52c81f27600934552550beb85aa9bf169f02d0e7f826cf74";
+    const INVITE_KEY: &str = "94bf8b0d89e579ddaeccf8d9db3f5de5c86a1259c597f2560ff0120173bc5e1f";
+    const COMMUNITY_ID: &str = "2b790bd59df98bdc52092b74ebd6933a89ef8eaeecc9030861cbdeae7c814c46";
+    const EPOCH_COMMITMENT: &str =
+        "3e6d6a3c9973c16d1ca7c5602d36979927c55c21a7e2c840f883af3f047e80a4";
+    const PINS_LOCATOR: &str = "3b4529395a35c981ed409b588af3c4cd3081992958a485347356a173c3146c52";
+    const EPOCH_MULTI: u64 = 0x0102030405060708;
+
+    /// `0x00..0x1f` / `0xff..0xe0` / `0x11` x32 — the inputs every vector uses.
+    fn secret() -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut key = [0u8; 32];
+        for (index, byte) in key.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            *byte = index as u8;
+        }
+        key
+    }
+
+    fn id32() -> [u8; 32] {
+        let mut id = [0u8; 32];
+        for (index, byte) in id.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+            *byte = 255 - index as u8;
+        }
+        id
+    }
+
+    fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+        data_encoding::HEXLOWER.encode(bytes)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn golden_vectors() {
+        let secret = secret();
+        let id = id32();
+        let alt = [0x11u8; 32];
+        let community_id = CommunityId::from_bytes(id);
+        let channel = ChannelId::from_bytes(id);
+
+        let channel_e0 = channel_group_key(&secret, &channel, Epoch(0)).expect("derives");
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex(channel_e0.keys().secret_key().as_secret_bytes()),
+            CHANNEL_E0_SEED
+        );
+        assert_eq!(channel_e0.pk_hex(), CHANNEL_E0_PK);
+        assert_eq!(
+            channel_group_key(&secret, &channel, Epoch(EPOCH_MULTI))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            CHANNEL_EMULTI_PK
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            control_group_key(&secret, &community_id, Epoch(0))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            CONTROL_E0_PK
+        );
+
+        let signer = control_signer_group_key(&secret, &community_id, Epoch(0)).expect("derives");
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex(signer.keys().secret_key().as_secret_bytes()),
+            CONTROL_SIGNER_E0_SEED
+        );
+        assert_eq!(signer.pk_hex(), CONTROL_SIGNER_E0_PK);
+        assert_eq!(
+            control_signer_group_key(&secret, &community_id, Epoch(EPOCH_MULTI))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            CONTROL_SIGNER_EMULTI_PK
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            guestbook_group_key(&secret, &community_id, Epoch(0))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            GUESTBOOK_E0_PK
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            channel_rekey_group_key(&secret, &channel, Epoch(1))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            CHANNEL_REKEY_E1_PK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_rekey_group_key(&secret, &community_id, Epoch(1))
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            BASE_REKEY_E1_PK
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            dissolved_group_key(&community_id)
+                .expect("derives")
+                .pk_hex(),
+            DISSOLVED_PK
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(hex(&grant_locator(&community_id, &alt)), GRANT_LOCATOR);
+        assert_eq!(hex(&banlist_locator(&community_id)), BANLIST_LOCATOR);
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex(&invite_links_locator(&community_id, &alt)),
+            INVITE_LINKS_LOCATOR
+        );
+        assert_eq!(hex(&pins_locator(&community_id, &channel)), PINS_LOCATOR);
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex(&recipient_locator(&secret, &alt, &id, Epoch(3))),
+            RECIPIENT_LOCATOR
+        );
+        assert_eq!(hex(&invite_bundle_key(&[0x07u8; TOKEN_LEN])), INVITE_KEY);
+
+        assert_eq!(hex(community_id_of(&secret, &alt).as_bytes()), COMMUNITY_ID);
+        assert_eq!(
+            hex(&epoch_key_commitment(Epoch(2), &secret)),
+            EPOCH_COMMITMENT
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/edition.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,552 @@
+use std::cmp::Reverse;
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::fmt;
+
+use data_encoding::HEXLOWER;
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::{EventId, PublicKey, Tag, UnsignedEvent};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::decode_hex_32;
+use crate::stream::build_rumor_secs;
+
+pub const KIND_CONTROL: u16 = 3308;
+
+const EDITION_LABEL: &[u8] = b"vector-community/v1/edition";
+
+/// Entity types an edition can address.
+pub mod vsk {
+    pub const COMMUNITY_METADATA: &str = "0";
+    pub const ROLE: &str = "1";
+    pub const CHANNEL_METADATA: &str = "2";
+    pub const GRANT: &str = "3";
+    pub const BANLIST: &str = "4";
+    pub const INVITE_LIVE: &str = "6";
+    pub const INVITE_LINKS: &str = "8";
+    pub const INVITE_REVOKED: &str = "9";
+    pub const DISSOLVED: &str = "10";
+    pub const PINS: &str = "11";
+}
+
+pub const TAG_SUBKIND: &str = "vsk";
+pub const TAG_CITATION: &str = "vac";
+
+const TAG_ENTITY: &str = "eid";
+const TAG_VERSION: &str = "ev";
+const TAG_PREV: &str = "ep";
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum EditionError {
+    BadKind(u16),
+    BadField(&'static str),
+    Duplicate(&'static str),
+    Missing(&'static str),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for EditionError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            EditionError::BadKind(kind) => write!(f, "not an edition kind: {kind}"),
+            EditionError::BadField(name) => write!(f, "malformed edition field: {name}"),
+            EditionError::Duplicate(name) => write!(f, "duplicate edition field: {name}"),
+            EditionError::Missing(name) => write!(f, "missing edition field: {name}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for EditionError {}
+
+/// A `vac`: the Grant edition an actor claims rank under, pinned by coordinate, version and hash.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct AuthorityCitation {
+    pub entity: [u8; 32],
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub hash: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ParsedEdition {
+    pub author: PublicKey,
+    pub subkind: String,
+    pub entity: [u8; 32],
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub prev: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    pub citation: Option<AuthorityCitation>,
+    pub content: String,
+    pub self_hash: [u8; 32],
+    pub rumor_id: EventId,
+}
+
+pub struct EditionFields<'a> {
+    pub author: PublicKey,
+    pub subkind: &'a str,
+    pub entity: [u8; 32],
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub prev: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    pub citation: Option<AuthorityCitation>,
+    pub content: &'a str,
+    pub at_secs: u64,
+}
+
+fn signing_bytes(
+    entity: &[u8; 32],
+    version: u64,
+    prev: Option<&[u8; 32]>,
+    content: &[u8],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut bytes =
+        Vec::with_capacity(8 + EDITION_LABEL.len() + 32 + 8 + 1 + 32 + 8 + content.len());
+
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(&(EDITION_LABEL.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(EDITION_LABEL);
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(entity);
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(&version.to_be_bytes());
+
+    match prev {
+        Some(prev) => {
+            bytes.push(1);
+            bytes.extend_from_slice(prev);
+        }
+        None => {
+            bytes.push(0);
+            bytes.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
+        }
+    }
+
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(&(content.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(content);
+    bytes
+}
+
+pub fn edition_hash(
+    entity: &[u8; 32],
+    version: u64,
+    prev: Option<&[u8; 32]>,
+    content: &[u8],
+) -> [u8; 32] {
+    Sha256::digest(signing_bytes(entity, version, prev, content)).into()
+}
+
+pub fn citation_tag(citation: &AuthorityCitation) -> Tag {
+    Tag::custom(
+        TAG_CITATION,
+        [
+            HEXLOWER.encode(&citation.entity),
+            citation.version.to_string(),
+            HEXLOWER.encode(&citation.hash),
+        ],
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn citation_from(fields: &[String]) -> Option<AuthorityCitation> {
+    if fields.len() != 4 {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    Some(AuthorityCitation {
+        entity: hex32(&fields[1], TAG_CITATION).ok()?,
+        version: canonical_decimal(&fields[2])?,
+        hash: hex32(&fields[3], TAG_CITATION).ok()?,
+    })
+}
+
+pub fn build_edition(fields: EditionFields<'_>) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    let mut tags = vec![
+        Tag::custom(TAG_SUBKIND, [fields.subkind]),
+        Tag::custom(TAG_ENTITY, [HEXLOWER.encode(&fields.entity)]),
+        Tag::custom(TAG_VERSION, [fields.version.to_string()]),
+    ];
+
+    if let Some(prev) = fields.prev {
+        tags.push(Tag::custom(TAG_PREV, [HEXLOWER.encode(&prev)]));
+    }
+
+    if let Some(citation) = fields.citation {
+        tags.push(citation_tag(&citation));
+    }
+
+    build_rumor_secs(
+        KIND_CONTROL,
+        fields.author,
+        fields.content,
+        tags,
+        fields.at_secs,
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn parse_edition(rumor: &UnsignedEvent) -> Result<ParsedEdition, EditionError> {
+    let kind = rumor.kind.as_u16();
+
+    if kind != KIND_CONTROL {
+        return Err(EditionError::BadKind(kind));
+    }
+
+    let subkind = value(rumor, TAG_SUBKIND)?
+        .ok_or(EditionError::Missing(TAG_SUBKIND))?
+        .to_owned();
+
+    if canonical_decimal(&subkind).is_none() {
+        return Err(EditionError::BadField(TAG_SUBKIND));
+    }
+
+    let entity = hex32(
+        value(rumor, TAG_ENTITY)?.ok_or(EditionError::Missing(TAG_ENTITY))?,
+        TAG_ENTITY,
+    )?;
+
+    let version =
+        canonical_decimal(value(rumor, TAG_VERSION)?.ok_or(EditionError::Missing(TAG_VERSION))?)
+            .ok_or(EditionError::BadField(TAG_VERSION))?;
+
+    let prev = match value(rumor, TAG_PREV)? {
+        Some(raw) => Some(hex32(raw, TAG_PREV)?),
+        None => None,
+    };
+
+    let citation = match fields(rumor, TAG_CITATION)? {
+        Some(fields) => Some(citation_from(fields).ok_or(EditionError::BadField(TAG_CITATION))?),
+        None => None,
+    };
+
+    let self_hash = edition_hash(&entity, version, prev.as_ref(), rumor.content.as_bytes());
+
+    Ok(ParsedEdition {
+        author: rumor.pubkey,
+        subkind,
+        entity,
+        version,
+        prev,
+        citation,
+        content: rumor.content.clone(),
+        self_hash,
+        rumor_id: rumor.id.unwrap_or_else(|| rumor.compute_id()),
+    })
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct EditionMeta {
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub self_hash: [u8; 32],
+    pub prev: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    pub tiebreak_id: EventId,
+}
+
+impl From<&ParsedEdition> for EditionMeta {
+    fn from(edition: &ParsedEdition) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            version: edition.version,
+            self_hash: edition.self_hash,
+            prev: edition.prev,
+            tiebreak_id: edition.rumor_id,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+pub struct FoldResult {
+    pub head: Option<usize>,
+    pub gap: bool,
+    pub anchored: bool,
+}
+
+/// The highest version whose chain is intact, given a held floor.
+pub fn fold(editions: &[EditionMeta], floor: u64, floor_hash: Option<&[u8; 32]>) -> FoldResult {
+    let mut by_version: BTreeMap<u64, usize> = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    for (index, edition) in editions.iter().enumerate() {
+        if edition.version < floor {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        match by_version.get(&edition.version) {
+            Some(&current) if editions[current].tiebreak_id <= edition.tiebreak_id => {}
+            _ => {
+                by_version.insert(edition.version, index);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let Some((&lowest_version, &lowest_index)) = by_version.first_key_value() else {
+        return FoldResult::default();
+    };
+
+    let lowest = editions[lowest_index];
+
+    let anchored = if floor == 0 {
+        lowest_version == 1 && lowest.prev.is_none()
+    } else if lowest_version == floor {
+        floor_hash == Some(&lowest.self_hash)
+    } else if lowest_version == floor + 1 {
+        floor_hash.is_some() && lowest.prev.as_ref() == floor_hash
+    } else {
+        false
+    };
+
+    let mut head = Some(lowest_index);
+    let mut gap = !anchored;
+    let mut previous_version = lowest_version;
+    let mut previous_hash = lowest.self_hash;
+
+    for (&version, &index) in by_version.range(lowest_version + 1..) {
+        let edition = editions[index];
+
+        if version == previous_version + 1 && edition.prev == Some(previous_hash) {
+            head = Some(index);
+            previous_version = version;
+            previous_hash = edition.self_hash;
+        } else {
+            gap = true;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    FoldResult {
+        head,
+        gap,
+        anchored,
+    }
+}
+
+/// The highest version overall, ignoring contiguity.
+pub fn bootstrap_head(editions: &[EditionMeta]) -> Option<usize> {
+    editions
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .min_by_key(|(_, edition)| (Reverse(edition.version), edition.tiebreak_id))
+        .map(|(index, _)| index)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+pub struct HeadSelection {
+    pub head: Option<usize>,
+    pub gap: bool,
+}
+
+/// The head to prefer for one entity, given what this client already committed to.
+pub fn fold_head(editions: &[EditionMeta], floor: Option<&EntityHead>) -> HeadSelection {
+    let Some(floor) = floor else {
+        return HeadSelection {
+            head: bootstrap_head(editions),
+            gap: false,
+        };
+    };
+
+    let anchored = fold(editions, floor.version, Some(&floor.self_hash));
+
+    if anchored.anchored {
+        return HeadSelection {
+            head: anchored.head,
+            gap: anchored.gap,
+        };
+    }
+
+    if anchored.head.is_none() && !anchored.gap {
+        return HeadSelection::default();
+    }
+
+    let fork = editions
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .filter(|(_, edition)| edition.version == floor.version)
+        .min_by_key(|(_, edition)| edition.tiebreak_id);
+
+    let winner = match fork {
+        Some((_, edition))
+            if edition.self_hash != floor.self_hash && edition.tiebreak_id < floor.rumor_id =>
+        {
+            edition.self_hash
+        }
+        _ => {
+            return HeadSelection {
+                head: None,
+                gap: true,
+            };
+        }
+    };
+
+    let refolded = fold(editions, floor.version, Some(&winner));
+
+    if refolded.anchored {
+        HeadSelection {
+            head: refolded.head,
+            gap: refolded.gap,
+        }
+    } else {
+        HeadSelection {
+            head: None,
+            gap: true,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A committed head, and the refuse-downgrade floor a later fold is judged against.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct EntityHead {
+    pub entity: [u8; 32],
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub self_hash: [u8; 32],
+    pub rumor_id: EventId,
+}
+
+impl From<&ParsedEdition> for EntityHead {
+    fn from(edition: &ParsedEdition) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            entity: edition.entity,
+            version: edition.version,
+            self_hash: edition.self_hash,
+            rumor_id: edition.rumor_id,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Every entity's committed head, keyed by coordinate.
+pub type Floors = BTreeMap<[u8; 32], EntityHead>;
+
+pub(crate) fn canonical_decimal(raw: &str) -> Option<u64> {
+    if raw.is_empty() || !raw.bytes().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit()) {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if raw.len() > 1 && raw.starts_with('0') {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    raw.parse().ok()
+}
+
+fn hex32(raw: &str, name: &'static str) -> Result<[u8; 32], EditionError> {
+    decode_hex_32(raw).map_err(|_| EditionError::BadField(name))
+}
+
+fn fields<'a>(
+    rumor: &'a UnsignedEvent,
+    name: &'static str,
+) -> Result<Option<&'a [String]>, EditionError> {
+    let mut found: Option<&[String]> = None;
+
+    for tag in rumor.tags.iter() {
+        let tag_fields = tag.as_slice();
+
+        if tag_fields.first().map(String::as_str) != Some(name) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if found.is_some() {
+            return Err(EditionError::Duplicate(name));
+        }
+
+        found = Some(tag_fields);
+    }
+
+    Ok(found)
+}
+
+fn value<'a>(
+    rumor: &'a UnsignedEvent,
+    name: &'static str,
+) -> Result<Option<&'a str>, EditionError> {
+    match fields(rumor, name)? {
+        Some(fields) if fields.len() == 2 => Ok(Some(fields[1].as_str())),
+        Some(_) => Err(EditionError::BadField(name)),
+        None => Ok(None),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn meta(version: u64, prev: Option<[u8; 32]>, hash: u8, tiebreak: u8) -> EditionMeta {
+        EditionMeta {
+            version,
+            self_hash: [hash; 32],
+            prev,
+            tiebreak_id: EventId::from_byte_array([tiebreak; 32]),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn head(version: u64, hash: u8, rumor: u8) -> EntityHead {
+        EntityHead {
+            entity: [0x11; 32],
+            version,
+            self_hash: [hash; 32],
+            rumor_id: EventId::from_byte_array([rumor; 32]),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fold_picks_the_head_from_the_chain_and_the_floor() {
+        let chain = [
+            meta(1, None, 0xa1, 1),
+            meta(2, Some([0xa1; 32]), 0xa2, 2),
+            meta(3, Some([0xa2; 32]), 0xa3, 3),
+        ];
+
+        let folded = fold(&chain, 0, None);
+        assert_eq!(folded.head, Some(2));
+        assert!(!folded.gap && folded.anchored);
+
+        // A missing link stops the walk at the last contiguous edition.
+        let gapped = fold(&[chain[0], chain[2]], 0, None);
+        assert_eq!(gapped.head, Some(0));
+        assert!(gapped.gap && gapped.anchored);
+
+        // Everything below the held floor is a stale relay, not a gap.
+        let stale = fold(&chain[..2], 3, Some(&[0xa3; 32]));
+        assert_eq!(stale.head, None);
+        assert!(!stale.gap && !stale.anchored);
+
+        // A fork at a version breaks on the lower inner rumor id, and the chain resumes.
+        let fork = [meta(1, None, 0xb1, 9), meta(1, None, 0xa1, 1)];
+        assert_eq!(
+            fold(&fork, 0, None).head,
+            Some(1),
+            "the lower rumor id wins"
+        );
+        let forked = [fork[0], fork[1], chain[1], chain[2]];
+        assert_eq!(fold(&forked, 0, None).head, Some(3));
+
+        // A re-wrap onto the head we hold is the legitimate case; one whose `prev` no
+        // longer resolves is a withholding.
+        let rewrapped = meta(5, Some([0x99; 32]), 0xc5, 5);
+        assert_eq!(
+            fold_head(&[rewrapped], Some(&head(4, 0x99, 4))).head,
+            Some(0)
+        );
+        let dangling = meta(5, Some([0x88; 32]), 0xc5, 5);
+        let refused = fold_head(&[dangling], Some(&head(4, 0x99, 4)));
+        assert_eq!(refused.head, None);
+        assert!(refused.gap);
+
+        // A bootstrap takes it anyway: a compaction would leave a joiner with nothing.
+        assert_eq!(bootstrap_head(&[dangling]), Some(0));
+        assert_eq!(fold_head(&[dangling], None).head, Some(0));
+
+        // A fork at the floor's own version converges to the lower rumor id when that is
+        // genuinely earlier than what we hold, and the chain above it re-anchors.
+        let forked = [
+            meta(2, Some([0xa1; 32]), 0xb2, 3),
+            meta(3, Some([0xb2; 32]), 0xb3, 4),
+        ];
+        let converged = fold_head(&forked, Some(&head(2, 0xaa, 9)));
+        assert_eq!(converged.head, Some(1));
+        assert!(!converged.gap);
+
+        // A fork that is not earlier than the held head is refused.
+        assert_eq!(fold_head(&forked, Some(&head(2, 0xaa, 2))).head, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn edition_hash_matches_the_cross_client_vector() {
+        let entity = [0x11u8; 32];
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            HEXLOWER.encode(&edition_hash(&entity, 1, None, b"hello")),
+            "2daf42e65a6bc259a4c99fac6df754a5d3d92310607cf13e2a1e8c94d42f6303"
+        );
+
+        // The golden vector only exercises the absent-prev encoding, so pin the flag.
+        let bytes = signing_bytes(&entity, 1, Some(&entity), b"hello");
+        assert_eq!(bytes[8 + EDITION_LABEL.len() + 32 + 8], 1);
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/guestbook.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,890 @@
+use std::cmp::Reverse;
+use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
+use std::fmt;
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use data_encoding::HEXLOWER;
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+
+use crate::edition::{
+    AuthorityCitation, TAG_CITATION, canonical_decimal, citation_from, citation_tag,
+};
+use crate::stream::{
+    KIND_WRAP, OpenedStream, SealForm, StreamError, build_rumor_ms, build_seal, open_wrap,
+    wrap_seal,
+};
+use crate::{GroupKey, decode_hex_32};
+
+pub const KIND_JOIN_LEAVE: u16 = 3306;
+pub const KIND_KICK: u16 = 3309;
+pub const KIND_SNAPSHOT: u16 = 3312;
+
+pub const MAX_SNAPSHOT_CHUNK: usize = 400;
+pub const MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_MS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+const TAG_INVITE: &str = "invite";
+const TAG_TARGET: &str = "p";
+const TAG_SNAP: &str = "snap";
+const TAG_CONTENT: &str = "content";
+const CONTENT_JOIN: &str = "join";
+const CONTENT_LEAVE: &str = "leave";
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum GuestbookError {
+    Stream(StreamError),
+    NotEncryptedSealed,
+    UnknownKind(u16),
+    MissingTag(&'static str),
+    DuplicateTag(&'static str),
+    BadTag(&'static str),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for GuestbookError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            GuestbookError::Stream(error) => write!(f, "stream: {error}"),
+            GuestbookError::NotEncryptedSealed => {
+                write!(f, "guestbook rumor must ride an encrypted seal")
+            }
+            GuestbookError::UnknownKind(kind) => {
+                write!(f, "not a guestbook rumor kind: {kind}")
+            }
+            GuestbookError::MissingTag(name) => write!(f, "missing guestbook tag: {name}"),
+            GuestbookError::DuplicateTag(name) => write!(f, "duplicate guestbook tag: {name}"),
+            GuestbookError::BadTag(name) => write!(f, "malformed guestbook tag: {name}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for GuestbookError {}
+
+impl From<StreamError> for GuestbookError {
+    fn from(error: StreamError) -> Self {
+        GuestbookError::Stream(error)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum GuestbookEntry {
+    Join {
+        member: PublicKey,
+        at_ms: u64,
+        /// The `(creator, label)` an invite attributed the join to.
+        invited_by: Option<(String, String)>,
+    },
+    Leave {
+        member: PublicKey,
+        at_ms: u64,
+    },
+    Kick {
+        actor: PublicKey,
+        target: PublicKey,
+        at_ms: u64,
+        citation: Option<AuthorityCitation>,
+    },
+    Snapshot {
+        refounder: PublicKey,
+        members: Vec<PublicKey>,
+        snapshot_id: [u8; 32],
+        chunk: (u32, u32),
+        at_ms: u64,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct GuestbookRumor {
+    pub id: EventId,
+    pub author: PublicKey,
+    pub kind: Kind,
+    pub at_ms: u64,
+    pub entry: GuestbookEntry,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum MemberState {
+    Joined {
+        at_ms: u64,
+        invited_by: Option<(String, String)>,
+    },
+    Left {
+        at_ms: u64,
+    },
+    Kicked {
+        at_ms: u64,
+        actor: PublicKey,
+    },
+}
+
+pub fn build_join(
+    member: PublicKey,
+    invited_by: Option<(&str, &str)>,
+    at_ms: u64,
+) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    let mut tags = Vec::new();
+
+    if let Some((creator, label)) = invited_by {
+        tags.push(Tag::custom(TAG_INVITE, [creator, label]));
+    }
+
+    build_rumor_ms(KIND_JOIN_LEAVE, member, CONTENT_JOIN, tags, at_ms)
+}
+
+pub fn build_leave(member: PublicKey, at_ms: u64) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    build_rumor_ms(KIND_JOIN_LEAVE, member, CONTENT_LEAVE, Vec::new(), at_ms)
+}
+
+pub fn build_kick(
+    actor: PublicKey,
+    target: &PublicKey,
+    citation: Option<&AuthorityCitation>,
+    at_ms: u64,
+) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    let mut tags = vec![Tag::custom(TAG_TARGET, [target.to_hex()])];
+
+    if let Some(citation) = citation {
+        tags.push(citation_tag(citation));
+    }
+
+    build_rumor_ms(KIND_KICK, actor, "", tags, at_ms)
+}
+
+pub fn build_snapshot_chunks(
+    refounder: PublicKey,
+    members: &[PublicKey],
+    snapshot_id: [u8; 32],
+    at_ms: u64,
+) -> Vec<UnsignedEvent> {
+    let chunks: Vec<&[PublicKey]> = members.chunks(MAX_SNAPSHOT_CHUNK).collect();
+    let total = chunks.len() as u32;
+
+    chunks
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .map(|(index, chunk)| {
+            let hex: Vec<String> = chunk.iter().map(PublicKey::to_hex).collect();
+            let content = format!(
+                "[{}]",
+                hex.iter()
+                    .map(|member| format!("\"{member}\""))
+                    .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+                    .join(",")
+            );
+            let tags = vec![Tag::custom(
+                TAG_SNAP,
+                [
+                    HEXLOWER.encode(&snapshot_id),
+                    (index as u32 + 1).to_string(),
+                    total.to_string(),
+                ],
+            )];
+
+            build_rumor_ms(KIND_SNAPSHOT, refounder, &content, tags, at_ms)
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+pub fn seal_rumor(
+    rumor: &UnsignedEvent,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    author: &Keys,
+) -> Result<(Event, Keys), GuestbookError> {
+    let kind = rumor.kind.as_u16();
+
+    if !is_guestbook_kind(kind) {
+        return Err(GuestbookError::UnknownKind(kind));
+    }
+
+    let seal = build_seal(rumor, SealForm::Encrypted, group, author)?;
+
+    Ok(wrap_seal(&seal, group, KIND_WRAP, rumor.created_at, &[])?)
+}
+
+pub fn open(
+    wrap: &Event,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+) -> Result<(OpenedStream, GuestbookRumor), GuestbookError> {
+    let opened = open_wrap(wrap, group)?;
+
+    if opened.seal_form != SealForm::Encrypted {
+        return Err(GuestbookError::NotEncryptedSealed);
+    }
+
+    let entry = entry_of(&opened)?;
+    let rumor = GuestbookRumor {
+        id: opened.rumor_id,
+        author: opened.author,
+        kind: opened.rumor.kind,
+        at_ms: opened.at_ms,
+        entry,
+    };
+
+    Ok((opened, rumor))
+}
+
+pub fn coalesce(
+    rumors: &[GuestbookRumor],
+    now_ms: u64,
+    snapshot_authority: Option<&PublicKey>,
+    can_kick: impl Fn(&PublicKey, &PublicKey, Option<&AuthorityCitation>) -> bool,
+) -> BTreeMap<PublicKey, MemberState> {
+    let mut states: BTreeMap<PublicKey, (u64, Reverse<EventId>, MemberState)> = BTreeMap::new();
+    let horizon = now_ms.saturating_add(MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_MS);
+
+    for rumor in rumors {
+        if rumor.at_ms > horizon {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        match &rumor.entry {
+            GuestbookEntry::Join {
+                member,
+                at_ms,
+                invited_by,
+            } => offer(
+                &mut states,
+                *member,
+                *at_ms,
+                rumor.id,
+                MemberState::Joined {
+                    at_ms: *at_ms,
+                    invited_by: invited_by.clone(),
+                },
+            ),
+            GuestbookEntry::Leave { member, at_ms } => offer(
+                &mut states,
+                *member,
+                *at_ms,
+                rumor.id,
+                MemberState::Left { at_ms: *at_ms },
+            ),
+            GuestbookEntry::Kick {
+                actor,
+                target,
+                at_ms,
+                citation,
+            } => {
+                if !can_kick(actor, target, citation.as_ref()) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                offer(
+                    &mut states,
+                    *target,
+                    *at_ms,
+                    rumor.id,
+                    MemberState::Kicked {
+                        at_ms: *at_ms,
+                        actor: *actor,
+                    },
+                );
+            }
+            GuestbookEntry::Snapshot {
+                refounder,
+                members,
+                at_ms,
+                ..
+            } => {
+                if snapshot_authority != Some(refounder) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                for member in members {
+                    offer(
+                        &mut states,
+                        *member,
+                        *at_ms,
+                        rumor.id,
+                        MemberState::Joined {
+                            at_ms: *at_ms,
+                            invited_by: None,
+                        },
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    states
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(member, (_, _, state))| (member, state))
+        .collect()
+}
+
+pub fn complete_memberlist(
+    coalesced: &BTreeMap<PublicKey, MemberState>,
+    observed: &BTreeMap<PublicKey, u64>,
+    granted: &BTreeSet<PublicKey>,
+    banned: &BTreeSet<PublicKey>,
+    banned_at: &BTreeMap<PublicKey, u64>,
+) -> BTreeSet<PublicKey> {
+    let mut candidates: BTreeSet<&PublicKey> = coalesced.keys().collect();
+    candidates.extend(observed.keys());
+    candidates.extend(granted.iter());
+
+    let mut members = BTreeSet::new();
+
+    for member in candidates {
+        let mut inclusion = observed.get(member).copied();
+
+        if let Some(state) = coalesced.get(member) {
+            match state {
+                MemberState::Joined { at_ms, .. } => {
+                    inclusion = Some(inclusion.map_or(*at_ms, |seen| seen.max(*at_ms)));
+                }
+                MemberState::Left { .. } | MemberState::Kicked { .. } => {}
+            }
+        }
+
+        if inclusion.is_none() && granted.contains(member) {
+            inclusion = Some(0);
+        }
+
+        let mut exclusion = match coalesced.get(member) {
+            Some(MemberState::Left { at_ms }) | Some(MemberState::Kicked { at_ms, .. }) => {
+                Some(*at_ms)
+            }
+            _ => None,
+        };
+
+        if banned.contains(member) {
+            exclusion = Some(match banned_at.get(member) {
+                Some(at_ms) => exclusion.map_or(*at_ms, |seen| seen.max(*at_ms)),
+                None => u64::MAX,
+            });
+        }
+
+        if let Some(inclusion) = inclusion
+            && exclusion.is_none_or(|exclusion| inclusion > exclusion)
+        {
+            members.insert(*member);
+        }
+    }
+
+    members
+}
+
+fn offer(
+    states: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, (u64, Reverse<EventId>, MemberState)>,
+    member: PublicKey,
+    at_ms: u64,
+    id: EventId,
+    state: MemberState,
+) {
+    let candidate = (at_ms, Reverse(id));
+
+    if let Some(existing) = states.get(&member)
+        && (existing.0, existing.1) >= candidate
+    {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    states.insert(member, (at_ms, Reverse(id), state));
+}
+
+fn is_guestbook_kind(kind: u16) -> bool {
+    matches!(kind, KIND_JOIN_LEAVE | KIND_KICK | KIND_SNAPSHOT)
+}
+
+fn entry_of(opened: &OpenedStream) -> Result<GuestbookEntry, GuestbookError> {
+    let rumor = &opened.rumor;
+    let author = opened.author;
+    let at_ms = opened.at_ms;
+
+    match rumor.kind.as_u16() {
+        KIND_JOIN_LEAVE => match rumor.content.as_str() {
+            CONTENT_JOIN => Ok(GuestbookEntry::Join {
+                member: author,
+                at_ms,
+                invited_by: invite_of(rumor),
+            }),
+            CONTENT_LEAVE => Ok(GuestbookEntry::Leave {
+                member: author,
+                at_ms,
+            }),
+            _ => Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_CONTENT)),
+        },
+        KIND_KICK => Ok(GuestbookEntry::Kick {
+            actor: author,
+            target: tagged_pubkey(rumor, TAG_TARGET)?,
+            at_ms,
+            citation: optional_citation(rumor)?,
+        }),
+        KIND_SNAPSHOT => {
+            let (snapshot_id, chunk) = snapshot_of(rumor)?;
+            let members = members_of(&rumor.content)?;
+
+            Ok(GuestbookEntry::Snapshot {
+                refounder: author,
+                members,
+                snapshot_id,
+                chunk,
+                at_ms,
+            })
+        }
+        other => Err(GuestbookError::UnknownKind(other)),
+    }
+}
+
+fn invite_of(rumor: &UnsignedEvent) -> Option<(String, String)> {
+    rumor.tags.iter().find_map(|candidate| {
+        let fields = candidate.as_slice();
+
+        (fields.len() >= 3 && fields[0] == TAG_INVITE)
+            .then(|| (fields[1].clone(), fields[2].clone()))
+    })
+}
+
+fn members_of(content: &str) -> Result<Vec<PublicKey>, GuestbookError> {
+    let entries: Vec<String> =
+        serde_json::from_str(content).map_err(|_| GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_CONTENT))?;
+
+    if entries.len() > MAX_SNAPSHOT_CHUNK {
+        return Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP));
+    }
+
+    entries
+        .iter()
+        .map(|entry| pubkey(entry, TAG_CONTENT))
+        .collect()
+}
+
+fn snapshot_of(rumor: &UnsignedEvent) -> Result<([u8; 32], (u32, u32)), GuestbookError> {
+    let fields = required(rumor, TAG_SNAP)?;
+
+    if fields.len() != 4 {
+        return Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP));
+    }
+
+    let snapshot_id = decode_hex_32(&fields[1]).map_err(|_| GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP))?;
+    let index = decimal(&fields[2])?;
+    let total = decimal(&fields[3])?;
+
+    if index == 0 || index > total {
+        return Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP));
+    }
+
+    Ok((snapshot_id, (index, total)))
+}
+
+fn optional_citation(rumor: &UnsignedEvent) -> Result<Option<AuthorityCitation>, GuestbookError> {
+    let Some(fields) = tag(rumor, TAG_CITATION)? else {
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+
+    citation_from(fields)
+        .map(Some)
+        .ok_or(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_CITATION))
+}
+
+fn decimal(raw: &str) -> Result<u32, GuestbookError> {
+    canonical_decimal(raw)
+        .and_then(|value| u32::try_from(value).ok())
+        .ok_or(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP))
+}
+
+fn required<'a>(
+    rumor: &'a UnsignedEvent,
+    name: &'static str,
+) -> Result<&'a [String], GuestbookError> {
+    tag(rumor, name)?.ok_or(GuestbookError::MissingTag(name))
+}
+
+fn tagged_pubkey(rumor: &UnsignedEvent, name: &'static str) -> Result<PublicKey, GuestbookError> {
+    pubkey(value(required(rumor, name)?, name)?, name)
+}
+
+fn tag<'a>(
+    rumor: &'a UnsignedEvent,
+    name: &'static str,
+) -> Result<Option<&'a [String]>, GuestbookError> {
+    let mut found: Option<&[String]> = None;
+
+    for candidate in rumor.tags.iter() {
+        let fields = candidate.as_slice();
+
+        if fields.first().map(String::as_str) != Some(name) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if found.is_some() {
+            return Err(GuestbookError::DuplicateTag(name));
+        }
+
+        found = Some(fields);
+    }
+
+    Ok(found)
+}
+
+fn value<'a>(fields: &'a [String], name: &'static str) -> Result<&'a str, GuestbookError> {
+    fields
+        .get(1)
+        .map(String::as_str)
+        .ok_or(GuestbookError::BadTag(name))
+}
+
+fn pubkey(hex: &str, name: &'static str) -> Result<PublicKey, GuestbookError> {
+    let bytes = decode_hex_32(hex).map_err(|_| GuestbookError::BadTag(name))?;
+
+    PublicKey::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|_| GuestbookError::BadTag(name))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::derive::guestbook_group_key;
+    use crate::stream::build_rumor_secs;
+    use crate::{CommunityId, Epoch};
+
+    const ROOT: [u8; 32] = [0x5au8; 32];
+    const AT: u64 = 1_700_000_000_000;
+
+    fn community() -> CommunityId {
+        CommunityId::from_bytes([0x11u8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn group() -> GroupKey {
+        guestbook_group_key(&ROOT, &community(), Epoch(0)).expect("derives")
+    }
+
+    fn citation() -> AuthorityCitation {
+        AuthorityCitation {
+            entity: [0x33u8; 32],
+            version: 1,
+            hash: [0x44u8; 32],
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn publish(rumor: &UnsignedEvent, author: &Keys) -> GuestbookRumor {
+        let wrap = seal_rumor(rumor, &group(), author).expect("seals").0;
+
+        open(&wrap, &group()).expect("opens").1
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn join_leave_kick_and_snapshot_converge_to_one_memberlist() {
+        let alice = Keys::generate();
+        let bob = Keys::generate();
+        let carol = Keys::generate();
+        let dave = Keys::generate();
+        let frank = Keys::generate();
+        let grace = Keys::generate();
+        let owner = Keys::generate();
+
+        let survivors: Vec<PublicKey> = (0..401).map(|_| Keys::generate().public_key()).collect();
+
+        let mut rumors = vec![
+            publish(
+                &build_join(
+                    alice.public_key(),
+                    Some((&"ab".repeat(32), "Reddit")),
+                    AT + 1_000,
+                ),
+                &alice,
+            ),
+            publish(&build_join(bob.public_key(), None, AT + 2_000), &bob),
+            publish(&build_leave(bob.public_key(), AT + 3_000), &bob),
+            publish(&build_join(dave.public_key(), None, AT + 4_000), &dave),
+            publish(
+                &build_kick(
+                    carol.public_key(),
+                    &dave.public_key(),
+                    Some(&citation()),
+                    AT + 5_000,
+                ),
+                &carol,
+            ),
+            publish(&build_join(frank.public_key(), None, AT + 7_000), &frank),
+        ];
+
+        let snapshot_id = "77".repeat(32);
+        let chunks =
+            build_snapshot_chunks(carol.public_key(), &survivors, [0x77u8; 32], AT + 6_000);
+        assert_eq!(chunks.len(), 2, "401 survivors chunk into two events");
+        for (index, chunk) in chunks.iter().enumerate() {
+            assert!(chunk.tags.iter().any(|tag| tag.as_slice()
+                == [
+                    TAG_SNAP,
+                    snapshot_id.as_str(),
+                    &(index + 1).to_string(),
+                    "2"
+                ]));
+            rumors.push(publish(chunk, &carol));
+        }
+
+        let can_kick =
+            |actor: &PublicKey, target: &PublicKey, citation: Option<&AuthorityCitation>| {
+                citation.is_some() && actor == &carol.public_key() && target != &owner.public_key()
+            };
+
+        let states = coalesce(&rumors, AT + 8_000, Some(&carol.public_key()), can_kick);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            states.get(&alice.public_key()),
+            Some(&MemberState::Joined {
+                at_ms: AT + 1_000,
+                invited_by: Some(("ab".repeat(32), "Reddit".to_owned())),
+            })
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            states.get(&bob.public_key()),
+            Some(&MemberState::Left { at_ms: AT + 3_000 })
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            states.get(&dave.public_key()),
+            Some(&MemberState::Kicked {
+                at_ms: AT + 5_000,
+                actor: carol.public_key(),
+            })
+        );
+        assert!(
+            survivors
+                .iter()
+                .all(|member| matches!(states.get(member), Some(MemberState::Joined { .. }))),
+            "every chunk seeds its own members"
+        );
+
+        let reversed: Vec<GuestbookRumor> = rumors.iter().rev().cloned().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            coalesce(&reversed, AT + 8_000, Some(&carol.public_key()), can_kick),
+            states,
+            "arrival order cannot change the fold"
+        );
+
+        let observed = BTreeMap::from([
+            (bob.public_key(), AT + 9_000),
+            (carol.public_key(), AT + 5_000),
+        ]);
+        let granted = BTreeSet::from([grace.public_key()]);
+        let banned = BTreeSet::from([frank.public_key()]);
+        let banned_at = BTreeMap::from([(frank.public_key(), AT + 8_000)]);
+
+        let members = complete_memberlist(&states, &observed, &granted, &banned, &banned_at);
+
+        let mut expected = BTreeSet::from([
+            alice.public_key(),
+            bob.public_key(),
+            carol.public_key(),
+            grace.public_key(),
+        ]);
+        expected.extend(survivors.iter().copied());
+
+        assert_eq!(members, expected);
+        assert!(
+            !members.contains(&dave.public_key()),
+            "a kicked member is out"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !members.contains(&frank.public_key()),
+            "a ban wins over a later join"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_kick_or_snapshot_without_authority_is_dropped() {
+        let moderator = Keys::generate();
+        let outsider = Keys::generate();
+        let owner = Keys::generate();
+        let kicked = Keys::generate();
+        let uncited = Keys::generate();
+        let unranked = Keys::generate();
+        let refounder = Keys::generate();
+        let impostor = Keys::generate();
+        let seeded = Keys::generate();
+        let smuggled = Keys::generate();
+
+        let can_kick = |actor: &PublicKey,
+                        target: &PublicKey,
+                        citation: Option<&AuthorityCitation>| {
+            citation.is_some() && actor == &moderator.public_key() && target != &owner.public_key()
+        };
+
+        let rumors = vec![
+            publish(
+                &build_kick(
+                    moderator.public_key(),
+                    &kicked.public_key(),
+                    Some(&citation()),
+                    AT,
+                ),
+                &moderator,
+            ),
+            publish(
+                &build_kick(moderator.public_key(), &uncited.public_key(), None, AT),
+                &moderator,
+            ),
+            publish(
+                &build_kick(
+                    outsider.public_key(),
+                    &unranked.public_key(),
+                    Some(&citation()),
+                    AT,
+                ),
+                &outsider,
+            ),
+            publish(
+                &build_kick(
+                    moderator.public_key(),
+                    &owner.public_key(),
+                    Some(&citation()),
+                    AT,
+                ),
+                &moderator,
+            ),
+        ];
+
+        let states = coalesce(&rumors, AT + 1_000, None, can_kick);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            states.get(&kicked.public_key()),
+            Some(&MemberState::Kicked {
+                at_ms: AT,
+                actor: moderator.public_key(),
+            })
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !states.contains_key(&uncited.public_key()),
+            "a kick cites the Grant it acts under"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !states.contains_key(&unranked.public_key()),
+            "a kick needs KICK"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !states.contains_key(&owner.public_key()),
+            "nobody kicks the owner"
+        );
+
+        let by_refounder = build_snapshot_chunks(
+            refounder.public_key(),
+            &[seeded.public_key()],
+            [0x77u8; 32],
+            AT,
+        )
+        .remove(0);
+        let by_impostor = build_snapshot_chunks(
+            impostor.public_key(),
+            &[smuggled.public_key()],
+            [0x88u8; 32],
+            AT,
+        )
+        .remove(0);
+
+        for authority in [None, Some(refounder.public_key())] {
+            let states = coalesce(
+                &[
+                    publish(&by_refounder, &refounder),
+                    publish(&by_impostor, &impostor),
+                ],
+                AT + 1_000,
+                authority.as_ref(),
+                |_, _, _| true,
+            );
+
+            assert_eq!(
+                states.contains_key(&seeded.public_key()),
+                authority.is_some(),
+                "only the epoch's refounder seeds, and there is no owner fallback"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                !states.contains_key(&smuggled.public_key()),
+                "a foreign snapshot never seeds"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_future_entry_a_bad_ms_and_a_malformed_snapshot_are_dropped() {
+        let member = Keys::generate();
+        let moderator = Keys::generate();
+        let target = Keys::generate();
+
+        let future = publish(
+            &build_join(member.public_key(), None, AT + MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_MS + 1),
+            &member,
+        );
+        let horizon = publish(
+            &build_join(member.public_key(), None, AT + MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_MS),
+            &member,
+        );
+        assert!(
+            coalesce(&[future], AT, None, |_, _, _| true).is_empty(),
+            "an entry more than an hour ahead is dropped"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            coalesce(&[horizon], AT, None, |_, _, _| true).len(),
+            1,
+            "the horizon itself is skew, not forgery"
+        );
+
+        let bad_ms = build_rumor_secs(
+            KIND_JOIN_LEAVE,
+            member.public_key(),
+            CONTENT_JOIN,
+            vec![Tag::custom("ms", ["1000"])],
+            AT / 1000,
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open(
+                &seal_rumor(&bad_ms, &group(), &member).expect("seals").0,
+                &group()
+            ),
+            Err(GuestbookError::Stream(StreamError::BadMs))
+        ));
+
+        let bad_verb = build_rumor_ms(KIND_JOIN_LEAVE, member.public_key(), "maybe", vec![], AT);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open(
+                &seal_rumor(&bad_verb, &group(), &member).expect("seals").0,
+                &group()
+            ),
+            Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_CONTENT))
+        ));
+
+        let ambiguous = build_rumor_ms(
+            KIND_KICK,
+            moderator.public_key(),
+            "",
+            vec![
+                Tag::custom(TAG_TARGET, [target.public_key().to_hex()]),
+                citation_tag(&citation()),
+                citation_tag(&citation()),
+            ],
+            AT,
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open(
+                &seal_rumor(&ambiguous, &group(), &moderator)
+                    .expect("seals")
+                    .0,
+                &group()
+            ),
+            Err(GuestbookError::DuplicateTag(TAG_CITATION))
+        ));
+
+        for fields in [
+            vec![snapshot_id(), "0".to_owned(), "2".to_owned()],
+            vec![snapshot_id(), "3".to_owned(), "2".to_owned()],
+            vec![snapshot_id(), "1".to_owned()],
+        ] {
+            let rumor = build_rumor_ms(
+                KIND_SNAPSHOT,
+                moderator.public_key(),
+                "[]",
+                vec![Tag::custom(TAG_SNAP, fields)],
+                AT,
+            );
+            assert!(matches!(
+                open(
+                    &seal_rumor(&rumor, &group(), &moderator).expect("seals").0,
+                    &group()
+                ),
+                Err(GuestbookError::BadTag(TAG_SNAP))
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn snapshot_id() -> String {
+        "ab".repeat(32)
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/invite.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,954 @@
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::collections::btree_map::Entry;
+use std::fmt;
+
+use data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD;
+use nostr::nips::nip01::Coordinate;
+use nostr::nips::nip19::{Nip19, Nip19Coordinate};
+use nostr::nips::nip44::v2::ConversationKey;
+use nostr::nips::nip59::{GiftWrapBuilder, UnwrappedGift};
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::control::{ImageRef, MAX_RELAYS};
+use crate::derive::{TOKEN_LEN, verify_community_id};
+use crate::edition::{TAG_SUBKIND, vsk};
+use crate::list::{canonical, union};
+use crate::stream::{self, NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT, StreamError};
+use crate::{ChannelId, CommunityId, Epoch, Extra, decode_hex_32};
+
+pub const KIND_BUNDLE: u16 = 33301;
+pub const KIND_INVITE_LIST: u16 = 13303;
+pub const KIND_DIRECT_INVITE: u16 = 3313;
+pub const FRAGMENT_VERSION: u8 = 4;
+pub const MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS: usize = 256;
+pub const MAX_BOOTSTRAP_RELAYS: usize = 3;
+pub const MAX_BUNDLE_EPOCH: u64 = 1 << 40;
+pub const MAX_INVITE_ENTRIES: usize = 64;
+
+const FLAG_STOCK_SET: u8 = 0x01;
+const INVITE_PATH: &str = "/invite/";
+const TAG_IDENTIFIER: &str = "d";
+const TAG_EXPIRATION: &str = "expiration";
+
+const RELAY_DICT: [&str; 4] = [
+    "wss://jskitty.com/nostr",
+    "wss://asia.vectorapp.io/nostr",
+    "wss://relay.ditto.pub",
+    "wss://relay.dreamith.to",
+];
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum InviteError {
+    Stream(StreamError),
+    Json(String),
+    BadHex(&'static str),
+    TooManyChannels(usize),
+    TooManyInvites(usize),
+    Oversize(usize),
+    Kind(u16),
+    EpochTooLarge(u64),
+    OwnerMismatch,
+    BadFragment(&'static str),
+    BadVersion(u8),
+    BadLink(&'static str),
+    BadEvent(&'static str),
+    Crypto(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for InviteError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            InviteError::Stream(error) => write!(f, "stream: {error}"),
+            InviteError::Json(error) => write!(f, "json: {error}"),
+            InviteError::BadHex(field) => write!(f, "{field} is not 32-byte lowercase hex"),
+            InviteError::TooManyChannels(count) => {
+                write!(
+                    f,
+                    "bundle carries {count} channels (cap {MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS})"
+                )
+            }
+            InviteError::TooManyInvites(count) => {
+                write!(
+                    f,
+                    "invite list carries {count} entries (cap {MAX_INVITE_ENTRIES})"
+                )
+            }
+            InviteError::Oversize(len) => {
+                write!(f, "invite list is {len} bytes (cap {NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT})")
+            }
+            InviteError::Kind(kind) => write!(f, "not an invite list kind: {kind}"),
+            InviteError::EpochTooLarge(epoch) => write!(f, "epoch {epoch} out of range"),
+            InviteError::OwnerMismatch => {
+                write!(f, "bundle owner does not reproduce its community_id")
+            }
+            InviteError::BadFragment(why) => write!(f, "bad invite fragment: {why}"),
+            InviteError::BadVersion(version) => {
+                write!(f, "unsupported invite fragment version {version}")
+            }
+            InviteError::BadLink(why) => write!(f, "bad invite link: {why}"),
+            InviteError::BadEvent(why) => write!(f, "bad invite bundle event: {why}"),
+            InviteError::Crypto(error) => write!(f, "crypto: {error}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for InviteError {}
+
+impl From<StreamError> for InviteError {
+    fn from(error: StreamError) -> Self {
+        InviteError::Stream(error)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ChannelGrant {
+    pub id: ChannelId,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub key: Option<String>,
+    pub epoch: Epoch,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CommunityInvite {
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    pub owner: PublicKey,
+    pub owner_salt: String,
+    pub community_root: String,
+    pub root_epoch: Epoch,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub control_pk: Option<PublicKey>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub channels: Vec<ChannelGrant>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub relays: Vec<String>,
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub icon: Option<ImageRef>,
+    /// Unix **ms**: past it the preview still renders, joining refuses.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub expires_at: Option<u64>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub creator_npub: Option<PublicKey>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub label: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+impl CommunityInvite {
+    pub fn from_bundle_json(json: &str) -> Result<Self, InviteError> {
+        let mut invite: Self =
+            serde_json::from_str(json).map_err(|error| InviteError::Json(error.to_string()))?;
+
+        if invite.channels.len() > MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS {
+            return Err(InviteError::TooManyChannels(invite.channels.len()));
+        }
+
+        invite.relays.truncate(MAX_RELAYS);
+        invite.validate()?;
+
+        Ok(invite)
+    }
+
+    pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), InviteError> {
+        if self.channels.len() > MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS {
+            return Err(InviteError::TooManyChannels(self.channels.len()));
+        }
+
+        for epoch in std::iter::once(self.root_epoch).chain(self.channels.iter().map(|c| c.epoch)) {
+            if epoch.0 > MAX_BUNDLE_EPOCH {
+                return Err(InviteError::EpochTooLarge(epoch.0));
+            }
+        }
+
+        let owner_salt = hex32(&self.owner_salt, "owner_salt")?;
+        hex32(&self.community_root, "community_root")?;
+
+        for channel in &self.channels {
+            if let Some(key) = &channel.key {
+                hex32(key, "channel key")?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if !verify_community_id(&self.community_id, &self.owner.to_bytes(), &owner_salt) {
+            return Err(InviteError::OwnerMismatch);
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn expired(&self, now_ms: u64) -> bool {
+        self.expires_at.is_some_and(|expires| now_ms > expires)
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum BundleState {
+    Live(Box<CommunityInvite>),
+    Revoked,
+}
+
+pub fn build_bundle_event(
+    link_signer: &Keys,
+    invite: &CommunityInvite,
+    bundle_key: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Result<Event, InviteError> {
+    invite.validate()?;
+
+    let json = serde_json::to_string(invite).map_err(json_error)?;
+    let content = seal_bundle(bundle_key, &json)?;
+
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_BUNDLE), content)
+        .tags([empty_identifier(), subkind_tag(vsk::INVITE_LIVE)])
+        .finalize(link_signer)
+        .map_err(crypto_error)
+}
+
+pub fn build_revocation(link_signer: &Keys) -> Result<Event, InviteError> {
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_BUNDLE), "")
+        .tags([empty_identifier(), subkind_tag(vsk::INVITE_REVOKED)])
+        .finalize(link_signer)
+        .map_err(crypto_error)
+}
+
+pub fn parse_bundle_event(
+    event: &Event,
+    expected_signer: &PublicKey,
+    bundle_key: &[u8; 32],
+) -> Result<BundleState, InviteError> {
+    if event.kind.as_u16() != KIND_BUNDLE {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadEvent("wrong kind"));
+    }
+
+    if event.pubkey != *expected_signer {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadEvent("author is not the link signer"));
+    }
+
+    if first_tag(event, TAG_IDENTIFIER).is_some_and(|identifier| !identifier.is_empty()) {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadEvent(
+            "bundle is not at the link's coordinate",
+        ));
+    }
+
+    event
+        .verify()
+        .map_err(|_| InviteError::BadEvent("signature invalid"))?;
+
+    match first_tag(event, TAG_SUBKIND).as_deref() {
+        Some(vsk::INVITE_REVOKED) => return Ok(BundleState::Revoked),
+        Some(vsk::INVITE_LIVE) => {}
+        _ => return Err(InviteError::BadEvent("unknown or missing bundle marker")),
+    }
+
+    let json = open_bundle(bundle_key, &event.content)?;
+
+    Ok(BundleState::Live(Box::new(
+        CommunityInvite::from_bundle_json(&json)?,
+    )))
+}
+
+pub fn stock_relays() -> Vec<String> {
+    RELAY_DICT.iter().map(|relay| relay.to_string()).collect()
+}
+
+pub fn encode_fragment(token: &[u8; TOKEN_LEN], relays: &[String]) -> Result<String, InviteError> {
+    let stock = relays == RELAY_DICT;
+
+    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(2 + TOKEN_LEN + relays.len() * 8);
+    bytes.push(FRAGMENT_VERSION);
+
+    if stock {
+        bytes.push(FLAG_STOCK_SET);
+    } else {
+        bytes.push(0x00);
+
+        let bounded = &relays[..relays.len().min(MAX_BOOTSTRAP_RELAYS)];
+        bytes.push(bounded.len() as u8);
+
+        for relay in bounded {
+            match dict_id(relay) {
+                Some(id) => bytes.push(id),
+                None => {
+                    let (lead, literal) = match relay.strip_prefix("wss://") {
+                        Some(host) => (0x00, host),
+                        None => (0xff, relay.as_str()),
+                    };
+
+                    if literal.len() > u8::MAX as usize {
+                        return Err(InviteError::BadFragment("relay too long"));
+                    }
+
+                    bytes.extend_from_slice(&[lead, literal.len() as u8]);
+                    bytes.extend_from_slice(literal.as_bytes());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    bytes.extend_from_slice(token);
+
+    Ok(BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&bytes))
+}
+
+pub fn decode_fragment(fragment: &str) -> Result<([u8; TOKEN_LEN], Vec<String>), InviteError> {
+    let bytes = BASE64URL_NOPAD
+        .decode(fragment.trim().as_bytes())
+        .map_err(|_| InviteError::BadFragment("not base64url"))?;
+
+    let version = *bytes.first().ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+    if version != FRAGMENT_VERSION {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadVersion(version));
+    }
+
+    let flags = *bytes.get(1).ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+    let mut offset = 2;
+    let mut relays = Vec::new();
+
+    if flags & FLAG_STOCK_SET != 0 {
+        relays = stock_relays();
+    } else {
+        let count = *bytes
+            .get(offset)
+            .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))? as usize;
+        offset += 1;
+
+        if count > MAX_BOOTSTRAP_RELAYS {
+            return Err(InviteError::BadFragment("too many bootstrap relays"));
+        }
+
+        for _ in 0..count {
+            let lead = *bytes
+                .get(offset)
+                .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+            offset += 1;
+
+            if (1..=254).contains(&lead) {
+                if let Some(url) = dict_url(lead) {
+                    relays.push(url.to_string());
+                }
+
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            let len = *bytes
+                .get(offset)
+                .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))? as usize;
+            offset += 1;
+
+            let end = offset
+                .checked_add(len)
+                .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+            let raw = bytes
+                .get(offset..end)
+                .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+            let text = std::str::from_utf8(raw)
+                .map_err(|_| InviteError::BadFragment("relay is not utf8"))?;
+
+            relays.push(match lead {
+                0x00 => format!("wss://{text}"),
+                0xff => text.to_string(),
+                _ => return Err(InviteError::BadFragment("unknown relay lead byte")),
+            });
+
+            offset = end;
+        }
+    }
+
+    let end = offset
+        .checked_add(TOKEN_LEN)
+        .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+    let raw = bytes
+        .get(offset..end)
+        .ok_or(InviteError::BadFragment("truncated"))?;
+
+    if end != bytes.len() {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadFragment("trailing bytes"));
+    }
+
+    let mut token = [0u8; TOKEN_LEN];
+    token.copy_from_slice(raw);
+
+    Ok((token, relays))
+}
+
+pub fn bundle_naddr(link_signer: &PublicKey) -> Result<String, InviteError> {
+    let coordinate = Coordinate {
+        kind: Kind::Custom(KIND_BUNDLE),
+        public_key: *link_signer,
+        identifier: String::new(),
+    };
+
+    Nip19::Coordinate(Nip19Coordinate {
+        coordinate,
+        relays: Vec::new(),
+    })
+    .to_bech32()
+    .map_err(|_| InviteError::BadLink("invalid naddr"))
+}
+
+pub fn build_invite_url(
+    base: &str,
+    link_signer: &PublicKey,
+    token: &[u8; TOKEN_LEN],
+    relays: &[String],
+) -> Result<String, InviteError> {
+    let naddr = bundle_naddr(link_signer)?;
+    let fragment = encode_fragment(token, relays)?;
+
+    Ok(format!(
+        "{}{INVITE_PATH}{naddr}#{fragment}",
+        base.trim_end_matches('/')
+    ))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ParsedInviteLink {
+    /// The bundle coordinate's author.
+    pub link_signer: PublicKey,
+    pub token: [u8; TOKEN_LEN],
+    pub bootstrap_relays: Vec<String>,
+    /// The bare naddr as it appeared in the link, for the fetch.
+    pub naddr: String,
+}
+
+pub fn parse_link(input: &str) -> Result<ParsedInviteLink, InviteError> {
+    let (locator, fragment) = input
+        .trim()
+        .split_once('#')
+        .ok_or(InviteError::BadLink("no fragment"))?;
+
+    if fragment.is_empty() {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadLink("empty fragment"));
+    }
+
+    let naddr = match locator.find(INVITE_PATH) {
+        Some(index) => locator[index + INVITE_PATH.len()..].trim_end_matches('/'),
+        None => locator.trim_start_matches("nostr:"),
+    };
+
+    let link_signer = signer_from_naddr(naddr)?;
+    let (token, bootstrap_relays) = decode_fragment(fragment)?;
+
+    Ok(ParsedInviteLink {
+        link_signer,
+        token,
+        bootstrap_relays,
+        naddr: naddr.to_string(),
+    })
+}
+
+pub fn build_direct_invite(
+    inviter: &Keys,
+    recipient: &PublicKey,
+    invite: &CommunityInvite,
+) -> Result<Event, InviteError> {
+    invite.validate()?;
+
+    let json = serde_json::to_string(invite).map_err(json_error)?;
+    let rumor = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_DIRECT_INVITE), json)
+        .finalize_unsigned(inviter.public_key());
+
+    let mut tags = vec![Tag::custom("k", [KIND_DIRECT_INVITE.to_string()])];
+
+    if let Some(expires_at) = invite.expires_at {
+        tags.push(Tag::custom(
+            TAG_EXPIRATION,
+            [(expires_at / 1000).to_string()],
+        ));
+    }
+
+    GiftWrapBuilder::new(*recipient, rumor)
+        .extra_tags(tags)
+        .finalize(inviter)
+        .map_err(crypto_error)
+}
+
+pub fn unwrap_direct_invite(
+    wrap: &Event,
+    recipient: &Keys,
+) -> Result<(PublicKey, CommunityInvite), InviteError> {
+    let unwrapped = UnwrappedGift::from_gift_wrap(recipient, wrap).map_err(crypto_error)?;
+
+    if unwrapped.rumor.kind.as_u16() != KIND_DIRECT_INVITE {
+        return Err(InviteError::BadEvent("rumor is not a direct invite"));
+    }
+
+    Ok((
+        unwrapped.sender,
+        CommunityInvite::from_bundle_json(&unwrapped.rumor.content)?,
+    ))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InviteEntry {
+    /// The link's unlock secret, and its merge key.
+    pub token: String,
+    /// The `link_signer` secret: refreshing or retiring the bundle needs it.
+    pub signer_sk: String,
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    pub url: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub label: Option<String>,
+    pub created_at: u64,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub expires_at: Option<u64>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InviteTombstone {
+    pub token: String,
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+/// A creator's own link bookkeeping.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InviteList {
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub entries: Vec<InviteEntry>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub tombstones: Vec<InviteTombstone>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+impl InviteList {
+    /// A tombstone beats an entry terminally, so a stale device can never resurrect a revoked link.
+    pub fn is_live(&self, token: &str) -> bool {
+        self.entries.iter().any(|entry| entry.token == token)
+            && !self
+                .tombstones
+                .iter()
+                .any(|tombstone| tombstone.token == token)
+    }
+
+    pub fn fits(&self) -> Result<(), InviteError> {
+        if self.entries.len() > MAX_INVITE_ENTRIES {
+            return Err(InviteError::TooManyInvites(self.entries.len()));
+        }
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(self).map_err(json_error)?;
+
+        if json.len() > NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT {
+            return Err(InviteError::Oversize(json.len()));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn merge_invite_lists(held: InviteList, incoming: InviteList) -> InviteList {
+    let mut entries: BTreeMap<String, InviteEntry> = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    for entry in held.entries.into_iter().chain(incoming.entries) {
+        match entries.entry(entry.token.clone()) {
+            Entry::Vacant(slot) => {
+                slot.insert(entry);
+            }
+            Entry::Occupied(mut slot) => {
+                let merged = merge_entry(slot.get(), &entry);
+                *slot.get_mut() = merged;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut tombstones: BTreeMap<String, InviteTombstone> = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    for tombstone in held.tombstones.into_iter().chain(incoming.tombstones) {
+        match tombstones.entry(tombstone.token.clone()) {
+            Entry::Vacant(slot) => {
+                slot.insert(tombstone);
+            }
+            Entry::Occupied(mut slot) => {
+                if canonical(&tombstone) < canonical(slot.get()) {
+                    *slot.get_mut() = tombstone;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut extra = held.extra;
+    union(&mut extra, incoming.extra);
+
+    InviteList {
+        entries: entries.into_values().collect(),
+        tombstones: tombstones.into_values().collect(),
+        extra,
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn build_invite_list(keys: &Keys, list: &InviteList) -> Result<Event, InviteError> {
+    list.fits()?;
+
+    let json = serde_json::to_string(list).map_err(json_error)?;
+    let content = stream::seal_to_self(keys, json.as_bytes())?;
+
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_INVITE_LIST), content)
+        .finalize(keys)
+        .map_err(crypto_error)
+}
+
+pub fn parse_invite_list(keys: &Keys, event: &Event) -> Result<InviteList, InviteError> {
+    if event.kind.as_u16() != KIND_INVITE_LIST {
+        return Err(InviteError::Kind(event.kind.as_u16()));
+    }
+
+    let json = stream::open_to_self(keys, &event.content)?;
+
+    serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(json_error)
+}
+
+/// An entry is immutable once minted, so two copies should agree.
+fn merge_entry(held: &InviteEntry, incoming: &InviteEntry) -> InviteEntry {
+    let (winner, loser) = if canonical(incoming) < canonical(held) {
+        (incoming, held)
+    } else {
+        (held, incoming)
+    };
+
+    let mut merged = winner.clone();
+    union(&mut merged.extra, loser.extra.clone());
+
+    merged
+}
+
+fn seal_bundle(bundle_key: &[u8; 32], json: &str) -> Result<String, InviteError> {
+    Ok(stream::seal_bytes(
+        &ConversationKey::new(*bundle_key),
+        json.as_bytes(),
+    )?)
+}
+
+fn open_bundle(bundle_key: &[u8; 32], content: &str) -> Result<String, InviteError> {
+    let plaintext = stream::open_bytes(&ConversationKey::new(*bundle_key), content)?;
+
+    String::from_utf8(plaintext).map_err(|_| InviteError::BadFragment("bundle is not utf8"))
+}
+
+fn signer_from_naddr(naddr: &str) -> Result<PublicKey, InviteError> {
+    match Nip19::from_bech32(naddr.trim_start_matches("nostr:")) {
+        Ok(Nip19::Coordinate(coordinate))
+            if coordinate.coordinate.kind.as_u16() == KIND_BUNDLE
+                && coordinate.coordinate.identifier.is_empty() =>
+        {
+            Ok(coordinate.coordinate.public_key)
+        }
+        _ => Err(InviteError::BadLink(
+            "naddr is not an invite-bundle coordinate",
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+fn hex32(value: &str, field: &'static str) -> Result<[u8; 32], InviteError> {
+    decode_hex_32(value).map_err(|_| InviteError::BadHex(field))
+}
+
+fn dict_id(relay: &str) -> Option<u8> {
+    RELAY_DICT
+        .iter()
+        .position(|known| *known == relay)
+        .map(|index| index as u8 + 1)
+}
+
+fn dict_url(id: u8) -> Option<&'static str> {
+    RELAY_DICT.get(id.checked_sub(1)? as usize).copied()
+}
+
+fn empty_identifier() -> Tag {
+    Tag::identifier("")
+}
+
+fn subkind_tag(value: &str) -> Tag {
+    Tag::custom(TAG_SUBKIND, [value])
+}
+
+fn first_tag(event: &Event, name: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    event.tags.iter().find_map(|tag| {
+        let fields = tag.as_slice();
+
+        (fields.len() >= 2 && fields[0] == name).then(|| fields[1].clone())
+    })
+}
+
+fn json_error(error: serde_json::Error) -> InviteError {
+    InviteError::Json(error.to_string())
+}
+
+fn crypto_error(error: impl fmt::Display) -> InviteError {
+    InviteError::Crypto(error.to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use data_encoding::HEXLOWER;
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::derive::{community_id_of, invite_bundle_key};
+
+    const SALT: [u8; 32] = [0x33u8; 32];
+
+    fn bundle() -> CommunityInvite {
+        let owner = Keys::generate();
+
+        CommunityInvite {
+            community_id: community_id_of(&owner.public_key().to_bytes(), &SALT),
+            owner: owner.public_key(),
+            owner_salt: HEXLOWER.encode(&SALT),
+            community_root: "44".repeat(32),
+            root_epoch: Epoch(0),
+            control_pk: None,
+            channels: vec![ChannelGrant {
+                id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0x9cu8; 32]),
+                key: Some("55".repeat(32)),
+                epoch: Epoch(1),
+                name: "lounge".to_owned(),
+                extra: Extra::default(),
+            }],
+            relays: vec!["wss://relay.example".to_owned()],
+            name: "Test community".to_owned(),
+            icon: None,
+            expires_at: None,
+            creator_npub: None,
+            label: None,
+            extra: Extra::default(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn token16() -> [u8; TOKEN_LEN] {
+        std::array::from_fn(|i| i as u8)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn fragment_goldens_pin_the_wire_layout() {
+        let token = token16();
+
+        // [04 version][01 stock flag][token 00..0f]
+        let stock = encode_fragment(&token, &stock_relays()).expect("encodes");
+        assert_eq!(stock, "BAEAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P");
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode_fragment(&stock).expect("decodes"),
+            (token, stock_relays())
+        );
+
+        // [04][00 flags][02 count][02 dict-id][04 dict-id][token 00..0f]
+        let mixed = vec![RELAY_DICT[1].to_owned(), RELAY_DICT[3].to_owned()];
+        let encoded = encode_fragment(&token, &mixed).expect("encodes");
+        assert_eq!(encoded, "BAACAgQAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P");
+        assert_eq!(decode_fragment(&encoded).expect("decodes"), (token, mixed));
+
+        // [04][00][01 count][ff verbatim lead][06 len]["ws://h"][token 00..0f]
+        let verbatim = vec!["ws://h".to_owned()];
+        let encoded = encode_fragment(&token, &verbatim).expect("encodes");
+        assert_eq!(encoded, "BAAB_wZ3czovL2gAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4P");
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode_fragment(&encoded).expect("decodes"),
+            (token, verbatim)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_fragment_is_strict_about_framing_and_counts() {
+        let token = token16();
+
+        for version in [3u8, 5] {
+            let mut bytes = vec![version, FLAG_STOCK_SET];
+            bytes.extend_from_slice(&token);
+            let encoded = BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&bytes);
+            assert!(
+                matches!(decode_fragment(&encoded), Err(InviteError::BadVersion(v)) if v == version),
+                "a legacy and a future version are both refused"
+            );
+        }
+
+        let mut trailing = vec![FRAGMENT_VERSION, FLAG_STOCK_SET];
+        trailing.extend_from_slice(&token);
+        trailing.push(0xff);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decode_fragment(&BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&trailing)),
+            Err(InviteError::BadFragment(_))
+        ));
+
+        let mut over = vec![FRAGMENT_VERSION, 0x00, 0x04, 1, 2, 3, 4];
+        over.extend_from_slice(&token);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            decode_fragment(&BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&over)),
+            Err(InviteError::BadFragment(_))
+        ));
+
+        // An unknown dictionary id is skipped, not fatal, so the dictionary can grow.
+        let mut unknown = vec![FRAGMENT_VERSION, 0x00, 0x01, 200];
+        unknown.extend_from_slice(&token);
+        let (decoded, relays) =
+            decode_fragment(&BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&unknown)).expect("decodes");
+        assert_eq!(decoded, token);
+        assert!(relays.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_link_round_trips_and_refuses_a_non_invite() {
+        let link_signer = Keys::generate();
+        let token = token16();
+        let relays = vec!["wss://a.example".to_owned()];
+
+        let url = build_invite_url(
+            "https://vectorapp.io/",
+            &link_signer.public_key(),
+            &token,
+            &relays,
+        )
+        .expect("builds");
+
+        let parsed = parse_link(&url).expect("parses");
+        assert_eq!(parsed.link_signer, link_signer.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(parsed.token, token);
+        assert_eq!(parsed.bootstrap_relays, relays);
+
+        let fragment = url.split('#').nth(1).expect("carries a fragment");
+        let bare = format!("{}#{fragment}", parsed.naddr);
+        let reparsed = parse_link(&bare).expect("parses the domain-agnostic form");
+        assert_eq!(reparsed.link_signer, link_signer.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(reparsed.token, token);
+
+        assert!(
+            parse_link("https://x/invite/#frag").is_err(),
+            "the naddr is not optional"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_bundle_round_trips_while_a_revocation_reads_as_revoked() {
+        let invite = bundle();
+        let link_signer = Keys::generate();
+        let key = invite_bundle_key(&[7u8; TOKEN_LEN]);
+
+        let event = build_bundle_event(&link_signer, &invite, &key).expect("builds");
+        assert_eq!(event.pubkey, link_signer.public_key());
+
+        match parse_bundle_event(&event, &link_signer.public_key(), &key).expect("parses") {
+            BundleState::Live(opened) => {
+                assert_eq!(opened.community_id, invite.community_id);
+                assert_eq!(opened.channels.len(), 1);
+            }
+            BundleState::Revoked => panic!("expected a live bundle"),
+        }
+
+        let revocation = build_revocation(&link_signer).expect("builds");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            parse_bundle_event(&revocation, &link_signer.public_key(), &key),
+            Ok(BundleState::Revoked)
+        ));
+
+        // The token is the only way in, and a squatter is a different coordinate.
+        assert!(
+            parse_bundle_event(
+                &event,
+                &link_signer.public_key(),
+                &invite_bundle_key(&[8u8; TOKEN_LEN])
+            )
+            .is_err()
+        );
+        let squatter = Keys::generate();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            parse_bundle_event(&event, &squatter.public_key(), &key),
+            Err(InviteError::BadEvent(_))
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_bundle_off_its_coordinate_or_off_its_owner_is_refused() {
+        let invite = bundle();
+        let link_signer = Keys::generate();
+        let key = invite_bundle_key(&[9u8; TOKEN_LEN]);
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&invite).expect("serializes");
+        let content = seal_bundle(&key, &json).expect("seals");
+
+        // The fetch filters on the author, so the empty `d` is pinned here: a
+        // signature-valid event of the same author at another `d` is not the bundle.
+        let elsewhere = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_BUNDLE), content)
+            .tags([Tag::identifier("elsewhere"), subkind_tag(vsk::INVITE_LIVE)])
+            .finalize(&link_signer)
+            .expect("signs");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            parse_bundle_event(&elsewhere, &link_signer.public_key(), &key),
+            Err(InviteError::BadEvent(_))
+        ));
+
+        let mut forged = bundle();
+        forged.owner = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        assert!(matches!(forged.validate(), Err(InviteError::OwnerMismatch)));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            build_bundle_event(&link_signer, &forged, &key),
+            Err(InviteError::OwnerMismatch)
+        ));
+
+        let mut malformed = bundle();
+        malformed.community_root = "not hex".to_owned();
+        assert!(matches!(malformed.validate(), Err(InviteError::BadHex(_))));
+
+        let mut crowded = bundle();
+        crowded.channels = (0..=MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS)
+            .map(|_| ChannelGrant {
+                id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0x01; 32]),
+                key: None,
+                epoch: Epoch(0),
+                name: String::new(),
+                extra: Extra::default(),
+            })
+            .collect();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            crowded.validate(),
+            Err(InviteError::TooManyChannels(n)) if n == MAX_BUNDLE_CHANNELS + 1
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_direct_invite_round_trips_and_refuses_a_foreign_rumor() {
+        let inviter = Keys::generate();
+        let recipient = Keys::generate();
+        let invite = bundle();
+
+        let wrap = build_direct_invite(&inviter, &recipient.public_key(), &invite).expect("builds");
+        assert_eq!(wrap.kind, Kind::GiftWrap);
+        assert_ne!(
+            wrap.pubkey,
+            inviter.public_key(),
+            "the wrap author is ephemeral"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            wrap.tags.iter().any(|tag| tag.as_slice() == ["k", "3313"]),
+            "the k tag is what makes an invite indexable"
+        );
+
+        let (sender, opened) = unwrap_direct_invite(&wrap, &recipient).expect("unwraps");
+        assert_eq!(sender, inviter.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(opened.community_id, invite.community_id);
+
+        // Somebody else's wrap is not ours to open...
+        let stranger = Keys::generate();
+        assert!(unwrap_direct_invite(&wrap, &stranger).is_err());
+
+        // ...and a wrap that opens to some other kind is not an invite.
+        let rumor = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(crate::chat::KIND_MESSAGE), "hello")
+            .finalize_unsigned(recipient.public_key());
+        let wrap = GiftWrapBuilder::new(recipient.public_key(), rumor)
+            .finalize(&recipient)
+            .expect("wraps");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            unwrap_direct_invite(&wrap, &recipient),
+            Err(InviteError::BadEvent(_))
+        ));
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+pub mod chat;
+pub mod control;
+pub mod derive;
+pub mod edition;
+pub mod guestbook;
+pub mod invite;
+pub mod list;
+pub mod pins;
+pub mod rekey;
+pub mod roles;
+pub mod store;
+pub mod stream;
+
+use std::fmt;
+use std::str::FromStr;
+
+use anyhow::{Result, anyhow, bail};
+use data_encoding::HEXLOWER;
+pub use derive::GroupKey;
+use rand::TryRng as _;
+use rand::rngs::SysRng;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
+
+/// Unknown fields a content struct does not model, so a republish cannot wipe them.
+pub(crate) type Extra = serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value>;
+
+macro_rules! hex_id {
+    ($(#[$meta:meta])* $name:ident) => {
+        $(#[$meta])*
+        #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
+        pub struct $name([u8; 32]);
+
+        impl $name {
+            pub fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+                Self(bytes)
+            }
+
+            pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
+                &self.0
+            }
+
+            pub fn to_hex(&self) -> String {
+                HEXLOWER.encode(&self.0)
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl From<[u8; 32]> for $name {
+            fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
+                Self(bytes)
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl fmt::Display for $name {
+            fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+                f.write_str(&self.to_hex())
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl fmt::Debug for $name {
+            fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+                write!(f, "{}({})", stringify!($name), self.to_hex())
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl FromStr for $name {
+            type Err = anyhow::Error;
+
+            fn from_str(value: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+                Ok(Self(decode_hex_32(value)?))
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl Serialize for $name {
+            fn serialize<S: Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
+                serializer.serialize_str(&self.to_hex())
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for $name {
+            fn deserialize<D: Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
+                let value = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+                value.parse().map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
+            }
+        }
+    };
+}
+
+hex_id! {
+    /// A self-certifying commitment to the owner's key, never on the wire.
+    CommunityId
+}
+
+hex_id! {
+    ChannelId
+}
+
+hex_id! {
+    /// Both a Role's entity coordinate and the field it repeats in its own content.
+    RoleId
+}
+
+/// A key-rotation counter; it bumps only on a Rekey that removes somebody.
+#[derive(
+    Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize,
+)]
+pub struct Epoch(pub u64);
+
+impl fmt::Display for Epoch {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}", self.0)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Uppercase and other non-canonical spellings are rejected.
+pub(crate) fn decode_hex_32(value: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+    decode_hex_lower::<32>(value)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn decode_hex_lower<const N: usize>(value: &str) -> Result<[u8; N]> {
+    let bytes = HEXLOWER
+        .decode(value.as_bytes())
+        .map_err(|error| anyhow!("invalid hex: {error}"))?;
+
+    let decoded: [u8; N] = bytes
+        .as_slice()
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| anyhow!("expected {N} bytes, got {}", bytes.len()))?;
+
+    if HEXLOWER.encode(&decoded) != value {
+        bail!("hex must be lowercase and canonical");
+    }
+
+    Ok(decoded)
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn fill_random(bytes: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    SysRng
+        .try_fill_bytes(bytes)
+        .map_err(|error| anyhow!("os rng: {error}"))
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn random_32() -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+    fill_random(&mut bytes)?;
+    Ok(bytes)
+}

crates/concord/src/list.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::collections::btree_map::Entry;
+use std::fmt;
+
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::invite::{ChannelGrant, CommunityInvite};
+use crate::stream::{self, NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT};
+use crate::{CommunityId, Epoch, Extra};
+
+pub const KIND_COMMUNITY_LIST: u16 = 13302;
+pub const MAX_MEMBERSHIPS: usize = 50;
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum ListError {
+    Kind(u16),
+    Crypto(String),
+    Json(String),
+    TooManyMemberships(usize),
+    Oversize(usize),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ListError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            ListError::Kind(kind) => write!(f, "not a community list kind: {kind}"),
+            ListError::Crypto(error) => write!(f, "crypto: {error}"),
+            ListError::Json(error) => write!(f, "json: {error}"),
+            ListError::TooManyMemberships(count) => {
+                write!(
+                    f,
+                    "list carries {count} memberships (cap {MAX_MEMBERSHIPS})"
+                )
+            }
+            ListError::Oversize(len) => {
+                write!(f, "list is {len} bytes (cap {NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT})")
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for ListError {}
+
+impl From<stream::StreamError> for ListError {
+    fn from(error: stream::StreamError) -> Self {
+        ListError::Crypto(error.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct JoinMaterial {
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    pub owner: PublicKey,
+    pub owner_salt: String,
+    pub community_root: String,
+    pub root_epoch: Epoch,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub control_pk: Option<PublicKey>,
+    /// Present only when the holder is staff.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub control_root: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub channels: Vec<ChannelGrant>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub relays: Vec<String>,
+    pub name: String,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CommunityListEntry {
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    pub seed: JoinMaterial,
+    pub current: JoinMaterial,
+    pub added_at: u64,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Tombstone {
+    pub community_id: CommunityId,
+    pub removed_at: u64,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CommunityList {
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub entries: Vec<CommunityListEntry>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub tombstones: Vec<Tombstone>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+impl CommunityList {
+    pub fn is_live(&self, community_id: &CommunityId) -> bool {
+        let added = self
+            .entries
+            .iter()
+            .find(|entry| entry.community_id == *community_id)
+            .map(|entry| entry.added_at);
+
+        match added {
+            None => false,
+            Some(added) => self
+                .tombstones
+                .iter()
+                .find(|tombstone| tombstone.community_id == *community_id)
+                .is_none_or(|tombstone| added > tombstone.removed_at),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn fits(&self) -> Result<(), ListError> {
+        if self.entries.len() > MAX_MEMBERSHIPS {
+            return Err(ListError::TooManyMemberships(self.entries.len()));
+        }
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(self).map_err(json_error)?;
+
+        if json.len() > NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT {
+            return Err(ListError::Oversize(json.len()));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn join_material(invite: &CommunityInvite, control_root: Option<&[u8; 32]>) -> JoinMaterial {
+    JoinMaterial {
+        community_id: invite.community_id,
+        owner: invite.owner,
+        owner_salt: invite.owner_salt.clone(),
+        community_root: invite.community_root.clone(),
+        root_epoch: invite.root_epoch,
+        control_pk: invite.control_pk,
+        control_root: control_root.map(|key| data_encoding::HEXLOWER.encode(key)),
+        channels: invite.channels.clone(),
+        relays: invite.relays.clone(),
+        name: invite.name.clone(),
+        extra: Extra::default(),
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn merge(held: CommunityList, incoming: CommunityList) -> CommunityList {
+    let mut entries: BTreeMap<CommunityId, CommunityListEntry> = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    for entry in held.entries.into_iter().chain(incoming.entries) {
+        match entries.entry(entry.community_id) {
+            Entry::Vacant(slot) => {
+                slot.insert(entry);
+            }
+            Entry::Occupied(mut slot) => merge_entry(slot.get_mut(), entry),
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut tombstones: BTreeMap<CommunityId, Tombstone> = BTreeMap::new();
+
+    for tombstone in held.tombstones.into_iter().chain(incoming.tombstones) {
+        match tombstones.entry(tombstone.community_id) {
+            Entry::Vacant(slot) => {
+                slot.insert(tombstone);
+            }
+            Entry::Occupied(mut slot) => {
+                let held = slot.get_mut();
+                held.removed_at = held.removed_at.max(tombstone.removed_at);
+                union(&mut held.extra, tombstone.extra);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut extra = held.extra;
+    union(&mut extra, incoming.extra);
+
+    CommunityList {
+        entries: entries.into_values().collect(),
+        tombstones: tombstones.into_values().collect(),
+        extra,
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn build_list_event(keys: &Keys, list: &CommunityList) -> Result<Event, ListError> {
+    list.fits()?;
+
+    let json = serde_json::to_string(list).map_err(json_error)?;
+    let content = stream::seal_to_self(keys, json.as_bytes())?;
+
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_COMMUNITY_LIST), content)
+        .finalize(keys)
+        .map_err(crypto_error)
+}
+
+pub fn parse_list_event(keys: &Keys, event: &Event) -> Result<CommunityList, ListError> {
+    if event.kind.as_u16() != KIND_COMMUNITY_LIST {
+        return Err(ListError::Kind(event.kind.as_u16()));
+    }
+
+    let json = stream::open_to_self(keys, &event.content)?;
+
+    serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(json_error)
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+enum Snapshot {
+    Seed,
+    Current,
+}
+
+fn merge_entry(held: &mut CommunityListEntry, incoming: CommunityListEntry) {
+    held.added_at = held.added_at.max(incoming.added_at);
+    held.seed = pick(&held.seed, &incoming.seed, Snapshot::Seed).clone();
+    held.current = pick(&held.current, &incoming.current, Snapshot::Current).clone();
+    union(&mut held.extra, incoming.extra);
+}
+
+fn pick<'a>(
+    held: &'a JoinMaterial,
+    incoming: &'a JoinMaterial,
+    which: Snapshot,
+) -> &'a JoinMaterial {
+    let preferred = match which {
+        Snapshot::Seed => incoming.root_epoch < held.root_epoch,
+        Snapshot::Current => incoming.root_epoch > held.root_epoch,
+    };
+
+    if preferred {
+        return incoming;
+    }
+
+    if incoming.root_epoch == held.root_epoch && canonical(incoming) < canonical(held) {
+        return incoming;
+    }
+
+    held
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn union(into: &mut Extra, other: Extra) {
+    for (key, value) in other {
+        let replace = match into.get(&key) {
+            Some(existing) => canonical(&value) < canonical(existing),
+            None => true,
+        };
+
+        if replace {
+            into.insert(key, value);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn canonical<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> String {
+    serde_json::to_string(value).unwrap_or_default()
+}
+
+fn json_error(error: serde_json::Error) -> ListError {
+    ListError::Json(error.to_string())
+}
+
+fn crypto_error(error: impl fmt::Display) -> ListError {
+    ListError::Crypto(error.to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn id(byte: u8) -> CommunityId {
+        CommunityId::from_bytes([byte; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn material(
+        community_id: CommunityId,
+        owner: PublicKey,
+        name: &str,
+        epoch: u64,
+    ) -> JoinMaterial {
+        JoinMaterial {
+            community_id,
+            owner,
+            owner_salt: "33".repeat(32),
+            community_root: "44".repeat(32),
+            root_epoch: Epoch(epoch),
+            control_pk: None,
+            control_root: None,
+            channels: vec![],
+            relays: vec!["wss://relay.example".to_owned()],
+            name: name.to_owned(),
+            extra: Extra::default(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn entry(
+        community_id: CommunityId,
+        seed: JoinMaterial,
+        current: JoinMaterial,
+        added_at: u64,
+    ) -> CommunityListEntry {
+        CommunityListEntry {
+            community_id,
+            seed,
+            current,
+            added_at,
+            extra: Extra::default(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn list(entries: Vec<CommunityListEntry>) -> CommunityList {
+        CommunityList {
+            entries,
+            ..Default::default()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn removal(community_id: CommunityId, removed_at: u64) -> CommunityList {
+        CommunityList {
+            tombstones: vec![Tombstone {
+                community_id,
+                removed_at,
+                extra: Extra::default(),
+            }],
+            ..Default::default()
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn merge_keeps_the_earlier_seed_and_the_later_current_either_way_round() {
+        let owner = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        let older = material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 1);
+        let newer = material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 3);
+
+        let a = list(vec![entry(id(0x11), older.clone(), newer.clone(), 5_000)]);
+        let b = list(vec![entry(id(0x11), newer, older, 5_000)]);
+
+        for merged in [merge(a.clone(), b.clone()), merge(b, a)] {
+            let merged = merged.entries.first().expect("one membership");
+            assert_eq!(
+                merged.seed.root_epoch,
+                Epoch(1),
+                "seed anchors the earliest epoch held"
+            );
+            assert_eq!(merged.current.root_epoch, Epoch(3));
+            assert_eq!(merged.added_at, 5_000);
+        }
+
+        // An epoch tie breaks on the whole snapshot's bytes, and does so for both
+        // orders, so two devices never flap competing republishes.
+        let alpha = material(id(0x11), owner, "Alpha", 2);
+        let beta = material(id(0x11), owner, "Beta", 2);
+        let a = list(vec![entry(id(0x11), alpha.clone(), alpha, 1)]);
+        let b = list(vec![entry(id(0x11), beta.clone(), beta, 1)]);
+
+        let first = merge(a.clone(), b.clone());
+        assert_eq!(first, merge(b, a));
+        assert_eq!(first.entries[0].current.name, "Alpha");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_tombstone_is_terminal_until_a_newer_join_outruns_it() {
+        let owner = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        let joined = entry(
+            id(0x11),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 0),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 0),
+            5_000,
+        );
+
+        let left = merge(list(vec![joined.clone()]), removal(id(0x11), 6_000));
+        assert!(!left.is_live(&id(0x11)));
+        assert_eq!(
+            left.entries.len(),
+            1,
+            "a retired entry stays in the document"
+        );
+
+        // A stale device re-merging the entry cannot resurrect it.
+        assert!(!merge(left.clone(), list(vec![joined.clone()])).is_live(&id(0x11)));
+
+        // A re-join genuinely newer than the removal does.
+        let rejoined = list(vec![entry(
+            id(0x11),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 0),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 0),
+            7_000,
+        )]);
+        let live = merge(left, rejoined);
+        assert!(live.is_live(&id(0x11)));
+
+        // And the older removal is not re-applied on top of it.
+        assert!(merge(live, removal(id(0x11), 6_000)).is_live(&id(0x11)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_second_device_reconstructs_membership_from_13302() {
+        let me = Keys::generate();
+        let owner = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        let mine = CommunityList {
+            entries: vec![
+                entry(
+                    id(0x11),
+                    material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 1),
+                    material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 4),
+                    AT,
+                ),
+                entry(
+                    id(0x22),
+                    material(id(0x22), owner, "Other", 0),
+                    material(id(0x22), owner, "Other", 0),
+                    AT + 1,
+                ),
+            ],
+            tombstones: vec![Tombstone {
+                community_id: id(0x33),
+                removed_at: AT,
+                extra: Extra::default(),
+            }],
+            extra: Extra::default(),
+        };
+
+        let event = build_list_event(&me, &mine).expect("builds");
+        assert_eq!(event.kind, Kind::Custom(KIND_COMMUNITY_LIST));
+        assert_eq!(parse_list_event(&me, &event).expect("parses"), mine);
+        assert!(
+            !parse_list_event(&me, &event)
+                .expect("parses")
+                .is_live(&id(0x33))
+        );
+
+        // Only the member's own keys open it, and an unreadable list is "no news".
+        let stranger = Keys::generate();
+        assert!(parse_list_event(&stranger, &event).is_err());
+
+        // Unknown fields survive the round trip, so a republish cannot wipe them.
+        let mut held = mine.clone();
+        held.extra
+            .insert("future".to_owned(), serde_json::json!({"deep": [1, 2]}));
+        held.entries[0]
+            .current
+            .extra
+            .insert("held_roots".to_owned(), serde_json::json!([{"epoch": 1}]));
+        let rebuilt =
+            parse_list_event(&me, &build_list_event(&me, &held).expect("builds")).expect("parses");
+        assert_eq!(rebuilt, held);
+
+        // The write gate refuses an over-cap or oversized List before publishing.
+        let crowded = list(
+            (0..=MAX_MEMBERSHIPS)
+                .map(|index| {
+                    let community_id = CommunityId::from_bytes([index as u8; 32]);
+                    entry(
+                        community_id,
+                        material(community_id, owner, "Room", 0),
+                        material(community_id, owner, "Room", 0),
+                        AT,
+                    )
+                })
+                .collect(),
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            build_list_event(&me, &crowded),
+            Err(ListError::TooManyMemberships(n)) if n == MAX_MEMBERSHIPS + 1
+        ));
+
+        let oversized = list(vec![entry(
+            id(0x11),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, &"x".repeat(NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT), 0),
+            material(id(0x11), owner, "Room", 0),
+            AT,
+        )]);
+        assert!(matches!(oversized.fits(), Err(ListError::Oversize(_))));
+    }
+
+    const AT: u64 = 1_719_800_000_000;
+}

crates/concord/src/pins.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use chacha20::ChaCha20;
+use chacha20::cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher};
+use data_encoding::{BASE64, HEXLOWER};
+use hkdf::Hkdf;
+use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+use crate::chat::{ChatAction, ChatRumor, KIND_COMMENT, KIND_EDIT, KIND_MESSAGE};
+use crate::edition::canonical_decimal;
+use crate::stream::{self, OpenedStream, SealForm, resolve_ms_strict};
+use crate::{ChannelId, Epoch, Extra, GroupKey, decode_hex_lower};
+
+pub const PIN_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 25;
+pub const PIN_MAX_CONTENT_BYTES: usize = 32_768;
+
+/// The serialized disclosure: `chacha_key[32] || chacha_nonce[12] || hmac_key[32]`.
+pub const MESSAGE_KEYS_BYTES: usize = 76;
+
+const TAG_CHANNEL: &str = "channel";
+const TAG_EPOCH: &str = "epoch";
+const TAG_TARGET: &str = "e";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum PinError {
+    NotEncryptedSeal,
+    BadPayload,
+    Unverifiable,
+    Unreadable,
+    TooManyEntries,
+    Oversize(usize),
+    Seal(String),
+    Encode(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for PinError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            PinError::NotEncryptedSeal => write!(f, "pin requires an encrypted seal"),
+            PinError::BadPayload => write!(f, "the seal payload does not open"),
+            PinError::Unverifiable => write!(f, "the entry would not verify"),
+            PinError::Unreadable => {
+                write!(f, "refusing to publish a pin list this client cannot read")
+            }
+            PinError::TooManyEntries => write!(f, "pin list exceeds {PIN_MAX_ENTRIES} entries"),
+            PinError::Oversize(len) => {
+                write!(
+                    f,
+                    "pin list content is {len} bytes (cap {PIN_MAX_CONTENT_BYTES})"
+                )
+            }
+            PinError::Seal(error) => write!(f, "seal: {error}"),
+            PinError::Encode(error) => write!(f, "encode: {error}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for PinError {}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct MessageKeys {
+    chacha_key: [u8; 32],
+    chacha_nonce: [u8; 12],
+    hmac_key: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+impl MessageKeys {
+    pub fn to_hex(&self) -> String {
+        let mut packed = [0u8; MESSAGE_KEYS_BYTES];
+        packed[0..32].copy_from_slice(&self.chacha_key);
+        packed[32..44].copy_from_slice(&self.chacha_nonce);
+        packed[44..76].copy_from_slice(&self.hmac_key);
+        HEXLOWER.encode(&packed)
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_hex(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        let bytes = decode_hex_lower::<MESSAGE_KEYS_BYTES>(value).ok()?;
+
+        Some(Self {
+            chacha_key: bytes[0..32].try_into().ok()?,
+            chacha_nonce: bytes[32..44].try_into().ok()?,
+            hmac_key: bytes[44..76].try_into().ok()?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn derive(conversation_key: &[u8; 32], nonce: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
+        let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::from_prk(conversation_key).ok()?;
+        let mut key_material = [0u8; MESSAGE_KEYS_BYTES];
+        hkdf.expand(nonce, &mut key_material).ok()?;
+
+        Some(Self {
+            chacha_key: key_material[0..32].try_into().ok()?,
+            chacha_nonce: key_material[32..44].try_into().ok()?,
+            hmac_key: key_material[44..76].try_into().ok()?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+struct Payload {
+    nonce: [u8; 32],
+    ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
+    mac: [u8; 32],
+}
+
+fn decode_payload(payload: &str) -> Option<Payload> {
+    let data = BASE64.decode(payload.as_bytes()).ok()?;
+
+    if data.len() < 99 || data[0] != 2 {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let mac_at = data.len() - 32;
+
+    Some(Payload {
+        nonce: data[1..33].try_into().ok()?,
+        ciphertext: data[33..mac_at].to_vec(),
+        mac: data[mac_at..].try_into().ok()?,
+    })
+}
+
+fn disclose_keys(payload: &str, conversation_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<MessageKeys> {
+    let decoded = decode_payload(payload)?;
+    MessageKeys::derive(conversation_key, &decoded.nonce)
+}
+
+fn open_payload(payload: &str, keys: &MessageKeys) -> Option<String> {
+    let decoded = decode_payload(payload)?;
+
+    let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(&keys.hmac_key).ok()?;
+    mac.update(&decoded.nonce);
+    mac.update(&decoded.ciphertext);
+    mac.verify_slice(&decoded.mac).ok()?;
+
+    let mut padded = decoded.ciphertext;
+    let mut cipher = ChaCha20::new((&keys.chacha_key).into(), (&keys.chacha_nonce).into());
+    cipher.apply_keystream(&mut padded);
+
+    unpad(&padded)
+}
+
+fn unpad(padded: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
+    let (len, prefix) = plaintext_length(padded)?;
+    let unpadded = padded.get(prefix..prefix.checked_add(len)?)?;
+
+    if len < 1 || padded.len() != prefix.checked_add(padded_len(len)?)? {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    String::from_utf8(unpadded.to_vec()).ok()
+}
+
+fn plaintext_length(padded: &[u8]) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
+    let short = u16::from_be_bytes(padded.get(..2)?.try_into().ok()?);
+
+    if short != 0 {
+        return Some((short as usize, 2));
+    }
+
+    let long = u32::from_be_bytes(padded.get(2..6)?.try_into().ok()?);
+
+    if long < 65_536 {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    Some((long as usize, 6))
+}
+
+fn padded_len(len: usize) -> Option<usize> {
+    if len < 1 {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if len <= 32 {
+        return Some(32);
+    }
+
+    let next_power = 1usize.checked_shl(usize::BITS - (len - 1).leading_zeros())?;
+    let chunk = if next_power <= 256 {
+        32
+    } else {
+        next_power / 8
+    };
+
+    Some(chunk * ((len - 1) / chunk + 1))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PinEditBundle {
+    pub seal: Event,
+    pub keys: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct PinEntry {
+    pub seal: Event,
+    pub keys: String,
+    /// An unverifiable locator hint; a mismatch is expected and never fatal.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub wrap: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub edit: Option<PinEditBundle>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub extra: Extra,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct EditedContent {
+    pub content: String,
+    pub at_ms: u64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct VerifiedPin {
+    pub rumor_id: EventId,
+    pub author: PublicKey,
+    pub kind: u16,
+    pub content: String,
+    pub tags: Tags,
+    pub epoch: Epoch,
+    pub at_ms: u64,
+    pub created_at: u64,
+    pub wrap: Option<String>,
+    pub edited: Option<EditedContent>,
+    pub entry: PinEntry,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub struct ReadPinList {
+    pub entries: Vec<PinEntry>,
+    pub sealed: bool,
+}
+
+pub fn build_entry(
+    opened: &OpenedStream,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+) -> Result<PinEntry, PinError> {
+    let keys = disclosed_keys(opened, group)?;
+
+    let entry = PinEntry {
+        seal: opened.seal.clone(),
+        keys: keys.to_hex(),
+        wrap: Some(opened.wrapper_id.to_hex()),
+        edit: None,
+        extra: Extra::default(),
+    };
+
+    if verify_entry(&entry, channel).is_none() {
+        return Err(PinError::Unverifiable);
+    }
+
+    Ok(entry)
+}
+
+pub fn build_edit_bundle(
+    edit: &OpenedStream,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    original: &VerifiedPin,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+) -> Result<PinEditBundle, PinError> {
+    let bundle = PinEditBundle {
+        seal: edit.seal.clone(),
+        keys: disclosed_keys(edit, group)?.to_hex(),
+    };
+
+    if verify_edit_bundle(&bundle, &original.author, &original.rumor_id, channel).is_none() {
+        return Err(PinError::Unverifiable);
+    }
+
+    Ok(bundle)
+}
+
+pub fn with_proven_edit(
+    entry: &PinEntry,
+    edit: &OpenedStream,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+) -> PinEntry {
+    let Some(original) = verify_entry(entry, channel) else {
+        return entry.clone();
+    };
+
+    let Ok(bundle) = build_edit_bundle(edit, group, &original, channel) else {
+        return entry.clone();
+    };
+
+    let mut refreshed = entry.clone();
+    refreshed.edit = Some(bundle);
+    refreshed
+}
+
+fn disclosed_keys(opened: &OpenedStream, group: &GroupKey) -> Result<MessageKeys, PinError> {
+    if opened.seal_form != SealForm::Encrypted {
+        return Err(PinError::NotEncryptedSeal);
+    }
+
+    let conversation: [u8; 32] = group
+        .conversation()
+        .as_bytes()
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| PinError::BadPayload)?;
+
+    let keys = disclose_keys(&opened.seal.content, &conversation).ok_or(PinError::BadPayload)?;
+
+    if open_payload(&opened.seal.content, &keys).is_none() {
+        return Err(PinError::BadPayload);
+    }
+
+    Ok(keys)
+}
+
+pub fn verify_entry(entry: &PinEntry, channel: &ChannelId) -> Option<VerifiedPin> {
+    let seal = &entry.seal;
+
+    if seal.kind.as_u16() != stream::KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED || seal.verify().is_err() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let keys = MessageKeys::from_hex(&entry.keys)?;
+    let plaintext = open_payload(&seal.content, &keys)?;
+    let rumor = UnsignedEvent::from_json(&plaintext).ok()?;
+
+    // NIP-59's impersonation check: the renderer shows the rumor's fields.
+    if rumor.pubkey != seal.pubkey {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let kind = rumor.kind.as_u16();
+
+    if kind != KIND_MESSAGE && kind != KIND_COMMENT {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    // CORD-01's binding, restated: a keyholder must not pin a message into another Channel's list.
+    if tag_value(&rumor, TAG_CHANNEL)? != channel.to_hex() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let epoch = Epoch(canonical_decimal(tag_value(&rumor, TAG_EPOCH)?)?);
+
+    // Recomputed from the decrypted bytes; a claimed `id` is never trusted.
+    rumor.verify_id().ok()?;
+    let rumor_id = rumor.compute_id();
+
+    let edited = entry
+        .edit
+        .as_ref()
+        .and_then(|bundle| verify_edit_bundle(bundle, &rumor.pubkey, &rumor_id, channel));
+
+    Some(VerifiedPin {
+        author: rumor.pubkey,
+        content: edited
+            .as_ref()
+            .map_or_else(|| rumor.content.clone(), |edited| edited.content.clone()),
+        epoch,
+        at_ms: resolve_ms_strict(&rumor).ok()?,
+        created_at: rumor.created_at.as_secs(),
+        tags: rumor.tags.clone(),
+        wrap: entry.wrap.clone(),
+        edited,
+        entry: entry.clone(),
+        kind,
+        rumor_id,
+    })
+}
+
+fn verify_edit_bundle(
+    bundle: &PinEditBundle,
+    original_author: &PublicKey,
+    original_id: &EventId,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+) -> Option<EditedContent> {
+    let seal = &bundle.seal;
+
+    // Checkable before any crypto: nobody else may revise another member's words.
+    if seal.kind.as_u16() != stream::KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED || seal.pubkey != *original_author {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if seal.verify().is_err() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let keys = MessageKeys::from_hex(&bundle.keys)?;
+    let plaintext = open_payload(&seal.content, &keys)?;
+    let rumor = UnsignedEvent::from_json(&plaintext).ok()?;
+
+    if rumor.pubkey != seal.pubkey || rumor.kind.as_u16() != KIND_EDIT {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if tag_value(&rumor, TAG_CHANNEL)? != channel.to_hex() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if tag_value(&rumor, TAG_TARGET)? != original_id.to_hex() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    rumor.verify_id().ok()?;
+
+    Some(EditedContent {
+        content: rumor.content.clone(),
+        at_ms: resolve_ms_strict(&rumor).ok()?,
+    })
+}
+
+fn tag_value<'a>(rumor: &'a UnsignedEvent, name: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {
+    rumor
+        .tags
+        .iter()
+        .find(|tag| tag.as_slice().first().map(String::as_str) == Some(name))
+        .and_then(|tag| tag.as_slice().get(1))
+        .map(String::as_str)
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct PlainForm {
+    entries: Vec<PinEntry>,
+}
+
+pub fn publishable(
+    read: &ReadPinList,
+    private: bool,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<String, PinError> {
+    if read.sealed {
+        return Err(PinError::Unreadable);
+    }
+
+    if private {
+        serialize_sealed(&read.entries, group, epoch)
+    } else {
+        serialize_public(&read.entries)
+    }
+}
+
+fn serialize_public(entries: &[PinEntry]) -> Result<String, PinError> {
+    let content = encode_form(entries)?;
+    check_caps(entries.len(), &content)?;
+
+    Ok(content)
+}
+
+fn serialize_sealed(
+    entries: &[PinEntry],
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<String, PinError> {
+    if entries.len() > PIN_MAX_ENTRIES {
+        return Err(PinError::TooManyEntries);
+    }
+
+    let inner = encode_form(entries)?;
+    let sealed = stream::seal_bytes(group.conversation(), inner.as_bytes())
+        .map_err(|error| PinError::Seal(error.to_string()))?;
+    let content = serde_json::json!({ "epoch": epoch.to_string(), "sealed": sealed }).to_string();
+
+    check_caps(entries.len(), &content)?;
+
+    Ok(content)
+}
+
+fn encode_form(entries: &[PinEntry]) -> Result<String, PinError> {
+    serde_json::to_string(&PlainForm {
+        entries: entries.to_vec(),
+    })
+    .map_err(|error| PinError::Encode(error.to_string()))
+}
+
+fn check_caps(count: usize, content: &str) -> Result<(), PinError> {
+    if count > PIN_MAX_ENTRIES {
+        return Err(PinError::TooManyEntries);
+    }
+
+    if content.len() > PIN_MAX_CONTENT_BYTES {
+        return Err(PinError::Oversize(content.len()));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn read_list(content: &str, unseal: impl Fn(Epoch) -> Option<GroupKey>) -> ReadPinList {
+    const EMPTY: ReadPinList = ReadPinList {
+        entries: Vec::new(),
+        sealed: false,
+    };
+
+    if content.len() > PIN_MAX_CONTENT_BYTES {
+        return EMPTY;
+    }
+
+    let Ok(value) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(content) else {
+        return EMPTY;
+    };
+
+    if value.get("entries").is_some() {
+        return match serde_json::from_value::<PlainForm>(value) {
+            Ok(form) if form.entries.len() <= PIN_MAX_ENTRIES => ReadPinList {
+                entries: form.entries,
+                sealed: false,
+            },
+            _ => EMPTY,
+        };
+    }
+
+    let (Some(epoch), Some(sealed)) = (
+        value.get("epoch").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str),
+        value.get("sealed").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str),
+    ) else {
+        return EMPTY;
+    };
+
+    let Some(epoch) = canonical_decimal(epoch) else {
+        return EMPTY;
+    };
+
+    let Some(group) = unseal(Epoch(epoch)) else {
+        return ReadPinList {
+            sealed: true,
+            ..EMPTY
+        };
+    };
+
+    let Ok(inner) = stream::open_bytes(group.conversation(), sealed) else {
+        return EMPTY;
+    };
+
+    let Ok(form) = serde_json::from_slice::<PlainForm>(&inner) else {
+        return EMPTY;
+    };
+
+    if form.entries.len() > PIN_MAX_ENTRIES {
+        return EMPTY;
+    }
+
+    ReadPinList {
+        entries: form.entries,
+        sealed: false,
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn killed_by(pin: &VerifiedPin, delete: &ChatRumor) -> bool {
+    delete.author == pin.author
+        && matches!(&delete.action, ChatAction::Delete { target, .. } if *target == pin.rumor_id)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use nostr::nips::nip44::v2::{self, ConversationKey};
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::chat::{ChatRumor, build_delete, build_edit, build_message, open, seal_rumor};
+    use crate::derive::channel_group_key;
+
+    const AT_MS: u64 = 1_700_000_000_000;
+    const SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x21u8; 32];
+
+    fn channel() -> ChannelId {
+        ChannelId::from_bytes([0xabu8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn group() -> GroupKey {
+        channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("derives")
+    }
+
+    fn conversation() -> ConversationKey {
+        *group().conversation()
+    }
+
+    /// A real message through the production seal/open pipeline, as a pinner sees it.
+    fn sealed_message(author: &Keys, text: &str, at_ms: u64) -> (OpenedStream, ChatRumor) {
+        let rumor = build_message(
+            author.public_key(),
+            &channel(),
+            Epoch(0),
+            text,
+            None,
+            at_ms,
+            None,
+        );
+        let (wrap, _) = seal_rumor(&rumor, &group(), author, false).expect("seals");
+
+        open(&wrap, &group(), &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("opens")
+    }
+
+    fn entry_for(author: &Keys, text: &str) -> (PinEntry, OpenedStream) {
+        let (opened, _) = sealed_message(author, text, AT_MS);
+        let entry = build_entry(&opened, &group(), &channel()).expect("builds");
+        (entry, opened)
+    }
+
+    fn some(entries: Vec<PinEntry>) -> ReadPinList {
+        ReadPinList {
+            entries,
+            sealed: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The load-bearing primitive: the reproduction must open what nostr's own
+    /// encryption produced, through the disclosure alone.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_disclosure_opens_its_message_and_nothing_else() {
+        let nonce = [0x5au8; 32];
+        let disclosure =
+            MessageKeys::derive(conversation().as_bytes().try_into().expect("32"), &nonce)
+                .expect("derives");
+
+        for text in ["a", "hello world", &"padding boundary ".repeat(40)] {
+            let raw = v2::encrypt_to_bytes_with_nonce(&conversation(), text.as_bytes(), nonce)
+                .expect("encrypts");
+            let payload = BASE64.encode(&raw);
+
+            assert_eq!(open_payload(&payload, &disclosure).as_deref(), Some(text));
+        }
+
+        // Another nonce discloses different keys, which open nothing else.
+        let other = v2::encrypt_to_bytes_with_nonce(&conversation(), b"second", [0x99u8; 32])
+            .expect("encrypts");
+        assert!(open_payload(&BASE64.encode(&other), &disclosure).is_none());
+
+        let hex = disclosure.to_hex();
+        assert_eq!(
+            MessageKeys::from_hex(&hex).map(|keys| keys.to_hex()),
+            Some(hex.clone())
+        );
+        assert!(MessageKeys::from_hex(&hex.to_uppercase()).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_built_entry_proves_its_author_and_cannot_cross_channels() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let (entry, opened) = entry_for(&author, "pin me");
+        let verified = verify_entry(&entry, &channel()).expect("verifies");
+
+        assert_eq!(verified.author, author.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(verified.content, "pin me");
+        assert_eq!(verified.rumor_id, opened.rumor_id);
+        assert_eq!(verified.at_ms, AT_MS);
+        assert_eq!(verified.epoch, Epoch(0));
+
+        // A keyholder must not be able to pin channel X's message into Y's list.
+        let foreign = ChannelId::from_bytes([0xcdu8; 32]);
+        assert!(verify_entry(&entry, &foreign).is_none());
+
+        // Tampered keys and a re-signed seal both fail.
+        let mut bad_keys = entry.clone();
+        bad_keys.keys = format!("00{}", &entry.keys[2..]);
+        assert!(verify_entry(&bad_keys, &channel()).is_none());
+
+        let mut forged = entry.clone();
+        forged.seal.pubkey = Keys::generate().public_key();
+        assert!(verify_entry(&forged, &channel()).is_none());
+
+        // A rumor carrying a claimed id that is not its own is refused.
+        let plaintext = stream::open_bytes(&conversation(), &opened.seal.content).expect("opens");
+        let mut value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext).expect("json");
+        value["id"] = serde_json::Value::String("00".repeat(32));
+
+        let raw = v2::encrypt_to_bytes_with_nonce(
+            &conversation(),
+            value.to_string().as_bytes(),
+            [0x11u8; 32],
+        )
+        .expect("encrypts");
+        let content = BASE64.encode(&raw);
+        let seal = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(stream::KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED), &content)
+            .custom_created_at(opened.seal.created_at)
+            .finalize(&author)
+            .expect("signs");
+
+        let lying = PinEntry {
+            keys: disclose_keys(&content, conversation().as_bytes().try_into().expect("32"))
+                .expect("discloses")
+                .to_hex(),
+            seal,
+            wrap: None,
+            edit: None,
+            extra: Extra::default(),
+        };
+        assert!(verify_entry(&lying, &channel()).is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_proven_edit_replaces_the_words_and_a_stranger_cannot_revise() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let (entry, original) = entry_for(&author, "teh typo");
+
+        let edit = build_edit(
+            author.public_key(),
+            &channel(),
+            Epoch(0),
+            original.rumor_id,
+            "the typo, fixed",
+            AT_MS + 5_000,
+            None,
+        );
+        let (wrap, _) = seal_rumor(&edit, &group(), &author, false).expect("seals");
+        let (edit_opened, _) = open(&wrap, &group(), &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("opens");
+
+        let refreshed = with_proven_edit(&entry, &edit_opened, &group(), &channel());
+        let verified = verify_entry(&refreshed, &channel()).expect("verifies");
+        assert_eq!(verified.content, "the typo, fixed");
+        assert_eq!(verified.edited.expect("edited").at_ms, AT_MS + 5_000);
+
+        // A stranger's edit of the same message never attaches.
+        let stranger = Keys::generate();
+        let hijack = build_edit(
+            stranger.public_key(),
+            &channel(),
+            Epoch(0),
+            original.rumor_id,
+            "hijacked",
+            AT_MS + 6_000,
+            None,
+        );
+        let (wrap, _) = seal_rumor(&hijack, &group(), &stranger, false).expect("seals");
+        let (hijack_opened, _) = open(&wrap, &group(), &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("opens");
+
+        let unchanged = with_proven_edit(&entry, &hijack_opened, &group(), &channel());
+        assert!(unchanged.edit.is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn both_list_forms_round_trip_and_obey_their_caps() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let (entry, _) = entry_for(&author, "hello");
+
+        let public =
+            publishable(&some(vec![entry.clone()]), false, &group(), Epoch(0)).expect("publishes");
+        let read = read_list(&public, |_| None);
+        assert!(!read.sealed);
+        assert_eq!(read.entries.len(), 1);
+        assert!(verify_entry(&read.entries[0], &channel()).is_some());
+
+        // A sealed list stays dark without its key, lights with it, and a wrong
+        // key reads empty rather than panicking.
+        let at_epoch_4 = channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel(), Epoch(4)).expect("derives");
+        let sealed = publishable(&some(vec![entry.clone()]), true, &at_epoch_4, Epoch(4))
+            .expect("publishes");
+
+        let dark = read_list(&sealed, |_| None);
+        assert!(dark.sealed && dark.entries.is_empty());
+
+        let lit = read_list(&sealed, |epoch| {
+            (epoch == Epoch(4))
+                .then(|| channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel(), Epoch(4)).expect("derives"))
+        });
+        assert!(!lit.sealed);
+        assert!(verify_entry(&lit.entries[0], &channel()).is_some());
+
+        assert!(read_list(&sealed, |_| Some(group())).entries.is_empty());
+
+        // 26 entries: the writer refuses, and a hand-built violating edition
+        // reads as empty rather than forking the chain.
+        let many = vec![entry; PIN_MAX_ENTRIES + 1];
+        assert_eq!(
+            publishable(&some(many.clone()), false, &group(), Epoch(0)),
+            Err(PinError::TooManyEntries)
+        );
+        let violating = serde_json::json!({ "entries": many }).to_string();
+        assert!(read_list(&violating, |_| None).entries.is_empty());
+
+        // Garbage never panics and never reads as a list.
+        for bad in [
+            "",
+            "not json",
+            "[]",
+            "42",
+            r#"{"entries": 7}"#,
+            r#"{"epoch":"04","sealed":"y"}"#,
+        ] {
+            let read = read_list(bad, |_| None);
+            assert!(read.entries.is_empty() && !read.sealed, "{bad}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_dark_list_is_never_reformed_and_only_the_author_kills_a_pin() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let (entry, _) = entry_for(&author, "delete me later");
+
+        let dark = ReadPinList {
+            entries: vec![entry.clone()],
+            sealed: true,
+        };
+        assert_eq!(
+            publishable(&dark, false, &group(), Epoch(0)),
+            Err(PinError::Unreadable)
+        );
+
+        let verified = verify_entry(&entry, &channel()).expect("verifies");
+
+        for author_keys in [&author, &Keys::generate()] {
+            let delete = build_delete(
+                author_keys.public_key(),
+                &channel(),
+                Epoch(0),
+                verified.rumor_id,
+                Some(KIND_MESSAGE),
+                None,
+                AT_MS + 1_000,
+            );
+            let (wrap, _) = seal_rumor(&delete, &group(), author_keys, false).expect("seals");
+            let (_, rumor) = open(&wrap, &group(), &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("opens");
+
+            assert_eq!(
+                killed_by(&verified, &rumor),
+                author_keys.public_key() == author.public_key()
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/store.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+use std::cmp::Reverse;
+use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
+use std::sync::LazyLock;
+
+use anyhow::{Result, anyhow};
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::*;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::chat::{self, ChatRumor, plane_keys};
+use crate::control::{
+    ChannelMetadata, CommunityGenesis, CommunityMetadata, ControlFold, ROOT_EPOCH,
+};
+use crate::derive::control_signer_group_key;
+use crate::edition::{EntityHead, Floors, ParsedEdition, vsk};
+use crate::stream::{KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL, OpenedStream};
+use crate::{ChannelId, CommunityId, Epoch, GroupKey};
+
+static LOCAL_KEYS: LazyLock<Keys> = LazyLock::new(Keys::generate);
+
+const MAX_PAGES: usize = 8;
+const CHANNEL_TAG: SingleLetterTag = SingleLetterTag::LOWERCASE_C;
+const MARK_TAG: SingleLetterTag = SingleLetterTag::LOWERCASE_T;
+const MARK_VALUE: &str = "concord";
+const WRAP_TAG: &str = "e";
+const KIND_TAG: &str = "k";
+const STATE_PREFIX: &str = "concord/";
+
+/// An already-expired rumor is refused at ingest. Returns whether it was kept.
+pub async fn cache_rumor(
+    database: &dyn NostrDatabase,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    opened: &OpenedStream,
+) -> Result<bool> {
+    if chat::expiration_of(&opened.rumor)?.is_some_and(|expiration| expiration <= Timestamp::now())
+    {
+        return Ok(false);
+    }
+
+    let tags = vec![
+        Tag::identifier(opened.rumor_id),
+        Tag::custom(KIND_TAG, [opened.rumor.kind.to_string()]),
+        Tag::custom(WRAP_TAG, [opened.wrapper_id.to_string()]),
+        Tag::custom(MARK_TAG.as_str(), [MARK_VALUE]),
+        Tag::custom(CHANNEL_TAG.as_str(), [channel.to_hex()]),
+        Tag::public_key(opened.author),
+    ];
+    let at = Timestamp::from_secs(opened.at_ms / 1000);
+    let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::ApplicationSpecificData, opened.rumor.as_json())
+        .tags(tags)
+        .custom_created_at(at)
+        .finalize_async(&*LOCAL_KEYS)
+        .await?;
+
+    database.save_event(&event).await?;
+
+    Ok(true)
+}
+
+pub async fn purge_expired(
+    database: &dyn NostrDatabase,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    now: Timestamp,
+) -> Result<usize> {
+    let filter = Filter::new()
+        .kind(Kind::ApplicationSpecificData)
+        .custom_tag(MARK_TAG, MARK_VALUE)
+        .custom_tag(CHANNEL_TAG, channel.to_hex());
+
+    let mut expired = Vec::new();
+
+    for event in database.query(filter).await? {
+        let Ok(rumor) = UnsignedEvent::from_json(&event.content) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Ok(Some(expiration)) = chat::expiration_of(&rumor) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        if expiration <= now {
+            expired.push(event.id);
+        }
+    }
+
+    let purged = expired.len();
+
+    if purged > 0 {
+        database.delete(Filter::new().ids(expired)).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(purged)
+}
+
+pub async fn query_rumors(
+    database: &dyn NostrDatabase,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    until: Option<Timestamp>,
+    limit: usize,
+) -> Result<Vec<UnsignedEvent>> {
+    let mut filter = Filter::new()
+        .kind(Kind::ApplicationSpecificData)
+        .custom_tag(MARK_TAG, MARK_VALUE)
+        .custom_tag(CHANNEL_TAG, channel.to_hex());
+
+    if let Some(until) = until {
+        filter = filter.until(until);
+    }
+
+    let mut newest: BTreeMap<String, Event> = BTreeMap::new();
+    for event in database.query(filter).await? {
+        let Some(rumor_id) = event.tags.identifier() else {
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        match newest.get(&rumor_id) {
+            Some(existing) if existing.created_at >= event.created_at => {}
+            _ => {
+                newest.insert(rumor_id, event);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut events: Vec<Event> = newest.into_values().collect();
+    events.sort_by_key(|event| std::cmp::Reverse(event.created_at));
+    events.truncate(limit);
+
+    let mut rumors = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
+    for event in events {
+        let rumor = UnsignedEvent::from_json(event.content)
+            .map_err(|error| anyhow!("cached rumor is not a valid event: {error}"))?;
+        rumors.push(rumor);
+    }
+
+    Ok(rumors)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct ChannelKeyRef {
+    pub id: ChannelId,
+    pub name: String,
+    pub private: bool,
+    pub epoch: Epoch,
+}
+
+/// One local document per community, keyed by `concord/<community_id>`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct CommunityState {
+    pub id: CommunityId,
+    pub owner: PublicKey,
+    pub owner_salt: [u8; 32],
+    pub community_root: [u8; 32],
+    pub root_epoch: Epoch,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub control_root: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")]
+    pub control_pks: BTreeMap<u64, PublicKey>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub channels: Vec<ChannelKeyRef>,
+    pub relays: Vec<RelayUrl>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub heads: Vec<EntityHead>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeSet::is_empty")]
+    pub banned: BTreeSet<PublicKey>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub dissolved: bool,
+    pub added_at_ms: u64,
+}
+
+impl CommunityState {
+    pub fn from_genesis(
+        genesis: &CommunityGenesis,
+        editions: &[ParsedEdition],
+        added_at_ms: u64,
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut channels = Vec::new();
+        let mut heads = Vec::with_capacity(editions.len());
+        let mut relays = Vec::new();
+
+        for edition in editions {
+            heads.push(EntityHead {
+                entity: edition.entity,
+                version: edition.version,
+                self_hash: edition.self_hash,
+                rumor_id: edition.rumor_id,
+            });
+
+            match edition.subkind.as_str() {
+                vsk::COMMUNITY_METADATA => {
+                    let metadata: CommunityMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&edition.content)?;
+                    relays.extend(
+                        metadata
+                            .relays
+                            .iter()
+                            .filter_map(|relay| RelayUrl::parse(relay).ok()),
+                    );
+                }
+                vsk::CHANNEL_METADATA => {
+                    let metadata: ChannelMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&edition.content)?;
+                    channels.push(ChannelKeyRef {
+                        id: ChannelId::from_bytes(edition.entity),
+                        name: metadata.name,
+                        private: metadata.private,
+                        epoch: ROOT_EPOCH,
+                    });
+                }
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+
+        let control_pks = BTreeMap::from([(
+            ROOT_EPOCH.0,
+            control_signer_group_key(
+                &genesis.control_root,
+                &genesis.identity.community_id,
+                ROOT_EPOCH,
+            )?
+            .pk(),
+        )]);
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            id: genesis.identity.community_id,
+            owner: genesis.identity.owner,
+            owner_salt: genesis.identity.owner_salt,
+            community_root: genesis.community_root,
+            root_epoch: ROOT_EPOCH,
+            control_root: Some(genesis.control_root),
+            control_pks,
+            channels,
+            relays,
+            heads,
+            banned: BTreeSet::new(),
+            dissolved: false,
+            added_at_ms,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn identifier(&self) -> String {
+        state_identifier(&self.id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn floors(&self) -> Floors {
+        self.heads
+            .iter()
+            .map(|head| (head.entity, head.clone()))
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    pub fn apply_fold(&mut self, fold: &ControlFold) {
+        self.heads = fold.floors.values().cloned().collect();
+        self.banned = fold.banned.clone();
+
+        if let Some(community) = &fold.community {
+            self.relays = community
+                .relays
+                .iter()
+                .filter_map(|relay| RelayUrl::parse(relay).ok())
+                .collect();
+        }
+
+        for (id, metadata) in &fold.channels {
+            if metadata.deleted.unwrap_or(false) {
+                self.channels.retain(|channel| channel.id != *id);
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            match self.channels.iter_mut().find(|channel| channel.id == *id) {
+                Some(channel) => {
+                    channel.name = metadata.name.clone();
+
+                    if !metadata.private {
+                        channel.private = false;
+                    }
+                }
+                None if !metadata.private => self.channels.push(ChannelKeyRef {
+                    id: *id,
+                    name: metadata.name.clone(),
+                    private: false,
+                    epoch: self.root_epoch,
+                }),
+                None => {}
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn state_identifier(id: &CommunityId) -> String {
+    format!("{STATE_PREFIX}{}", id.to_hex())
+}
+
+pub async fn save_state<D>(database: &D, state: &CommunityState) -> Result<()>
+where
+    D: NostrDatabase,
+{
+    let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::ApplicationSpecificData, serde_json::to_string(state)?)
+        .tags([Tag::identifier(state.identifier())])
+        .finalize_async(&*LOCAL_KEYS)
+        .await?;
+
+    database.save_event(&event).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub async fn load_state<D>(database: &D, id: &CommunityId) -> Result<Option<CommunityState>>
+where
+    D: NostrDatabase,
+{
+    let filter = Filter::new()
+        .kind(Kind::ApplicationSpecificData)
+        .identifier(state_identifier(id))
+        .limit(1);
+
+    match database.query(filter).await?.into_iter().next() {
+        Some(event) => Ok(Some(serde_json::from_str(&event.content)?)),
+        None => Ok(None),
+    }
+}
+
+pub async fn backfill(
+    client: &Client,
+    database: &dyn NostrDatabase,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    held: &[(Epoch, [u8; 32])],
+    until: Option<Timestamp>,
+    limit: usize,
+) -> Result<Vec<ChatRumor>> {
+    let planes = plane_keys(held, channel)?;
+    let authors: Vec<PublicKey> = planes.iter().map(|(_, group)| group.pk()).collect();
+
+    let mut cursor = until;
+    let mut seen: BTreeSet<EventId> = BTreeSet::new();
+    let mut found: Vec<ChatRumor> = Vec::new();
+
+    for _ in 0..MAX_PAGES {
+        let page = fetch_page(client, &authors, cursor, limit).await?;
+
+        if page.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        let (fresh, next) = advance(&page, &planes, channel, cursor, limit, &mut seen);
+
+        for (opened, rumor) in fresh {
+            if cache_rumor(database, channel, &opened).await? {
+                found.push(rumor);
+            }
+        }
+
+        match next {
+            Some(next) => cursor = Some(next),
+            None => break,
+        }
+    }
+
+    found.sort_by_key(|rumor| (Reverse(rumor.at_ms), rumor.id));
+    found.truncate(limit);
+
+    Ok(found)
+}
+
+fn advance(
+    page: &BTreeSet<Event>,
+    planes: &[(Epoch, GroupKey)],
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    cursor: Option<Timestamp>,
+    limit: usize,
+    seen: &mut BTreeSet<EventId>,
+) -> (Vec<(OpenedStream, ChatRumor)>, Option<Timestamp>) {
+    let mut fresh = Vec::new();
+
+    for wrap in page {
+        let Some((epoch, group)) = planes.iter().find(|(_, group)| group.pk() == wrap.pubkey)
+        else {
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Ok((opened, rumor)) = chat::open(wrap, group, channel, *epoch) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        if seen.insert(rumor.id) {
+            fresh.push((opened, rumor));
+        }
+    }
+
+    if fresh.is_empty() || page.len() < limit {
+        return (fresh, None);
+    }
+
+    let oldest = page.iter().map(|event| event.created_at).min();
+
+    match oldest {
+        Some(oldest) if cursor != Some(oldest) => (fresh, Some(oldest)),
+        _ => (fresh, None),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn fetch_page(
+    client: &Client,
+    authors: &[PublicKey],
+    until: Option<Timestamp>,
+    limit: usize,
+) -> Result<BTreeSet<Event>> {
+    let mut filter = Filter::new()
+        .kinds([Kind::GiftWrap, Kind::Custom(KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL)])
+        .authors(authors.iter().copied())
+        .limit(limit);
+
+    if let Some(until) = until {
+        filter = filter.until(until);
+    }
+
+    Ok(client.fetch_events(filter).await?)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use nostr_memory::MemoryDatabase;
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::Epoch;
+    use crate::chat::{build_message, seal_rumor};
+    use crate::derive::channel_group_key;
+    use crate::stream::{
+        KIND_WRAP, SealForm, build_rumor_ms, build_seal, channel_binding_tags, open_wrap, wrap_seal,
+    };
+
+    const SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x07u8; 32];
+    const NEXT_SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x11u8; 32];
+
+    /// What a relay does with an inclusive `until` and a `limit`.
+    fn serve_page(
+        relay: &BTreeSet<Event>,
+        cursor: Option<Timestamp>,
+        limit: usize,
+    ) -> BTreeSet<Event> {
+        let mut events: Vec<Event> = relay
+            .iter()
+            .filter(|event| cursor.is_none_or(|cursor| event.created_at <= cursor))
+            .cloned()
+            .collect();
+
+        events.sort_by_key(|event| Reverse(event.created_at));
+        events.truncate(limit);
+        events.into_iter().collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn history_pages_back_across_a_rekey() {
+        let channel = ChannelId::from_bytes([0x9cu8; 32]);
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let held = [(Epoch(0), SECRET), (Epoch(1), NEXT_SECRET)];
+        let planes = plane_keys(&held, &channel).expect("derives");
+
+        // Three messages a second apart: a page boundary falls between each.
+        let base = 1_700_000_000_000;
+        let mut relay: BTreeSet<Event> = BTreeSet::new();
+
+        for (content, secret, epoch, at_ms) in [
+            ("before the rekey", &SECRET, Epoch(0), base),
+            ("still before", &SECRET, Epoch(0), base + 1_000),
+            ("after the rekey", &NEXT_SECRET, Epoch(1), base + 2_000),
+        ] {
+            let group = channel_group_key(secret, &channel, epoch).expect("derives");
+            let rumor = build_message(
+                author.public_key(),
+                &channel,
+                epoch,
+                content,
+                None,
+                at_ms,
+                None,
+            );
+            relay.insert(seal_rumor(&rumor, &group, &author, false).expect("seals").0);
+        }
+
+        let mut seen = BTreeSet::new();
+        let mut found = Vec::new();
+        let mut cursor = None;
+
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let page = serve_page(&relay, cursor, 2);
+            let (fresh, next) = advance(&page, &planes, &channel, cursor, 2, &mut seen);
+
+            found.extend(fresh.into_iter().map(|(_, rumor)| rumor));
+
+            match next {
+                Some(next) => cursor = Some(next),
+                None => break,
+            }
+        }
+
+        found.sort_by_key(|rumor| (Reverse(rumor.at_ms), rumor.id));
+
+        let contents: Vec<&str> = found.iter().map(|rumor| rumor.content.as_str()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            contents,
+            ["after the rekey", "still before", "before the rekey"]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rumors_read_back_after_a_restart() {
+        let database = MemoryDatabase::unbounded();
+        let channel = ChannelId::from_bytes([0xabu8; 32]);
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+
+        smol::block_on(async {
+            let group = channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel, Epoch(0)).expect("derives");
+
+            for (content, at_ms) in [("first", 1_000_000u64), ("second", 2_000_000)] {
+                let rumor = build_rumor_ms(
+                    9,
+                    author.public_key(),
+                    content,
+                    channel_binding_tags(&channel, Epoch(0)),
+                    at_ms,
+                );
+                let seal = build_seal(&rumor, SealForm::Encrypted, &group, &author).expect("seals");
+                let (wrap, _) = wrap_seal(
+                    &seal,
+                    &group,
+                    KIND_WRAP,
+                    Timestamp::from_secs(at_ms / 1000),
+                    &[],
+                )
+                .expect("wraps");
+
+                let opened = open_wrap(&wrap, &group).expect("opens");
+                cache_rumor(&database, &channel, &opened)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("caches");
+            }
+
+            // The group key is gone; only the local cache stands in for it.
+            let rumors = query_rumors(&database, &channel, None, 10)
+                .await
+                .expect("queries");
+            assert_eq!(rumors.len(), 2, "both messages come back");
+            assert_eq!(rumors[0].content, "second", "newest first");
+            assert_eq!(rumors[1].content, "first");
+
+            // A page boundary in message time, not in cache time.
+            let until = Timestamp::from_secs(1_500);
+            let page = query_rumors(&database, &channel, Some(until), 10)
+                .await
+                .expect("queries");
+            assert_eq!(page.len(), 1);
+            assert_eq!(page[0].content, "first");
+
+            let capped = query_rumors(&database, &channel, None, 1)
+                .await
+                .expect("queries");
+            assert_eq!(capped.len(), 1);
+            assert_eq!(capped[0].content, "second");
+        });
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_expired_rumor_is_refused_at_ingest_and_purged_by_the_sweep() {
+        let database = MemoryDatabase::unbounded();
+        let channel = ChannelId::from_bytes([0x77u8; 32]);
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let group = channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel, Epoch(0)).expect("derives");
+        let now = Timestamp::now().as_secs();
+
+        smol::block_on(async {
+            // A live timer is stored; one that already elapsed is refused at ingest.
+            assert!(
+                cache(
+                    &database,
+                    &group,
+                    &channel,
+                    &author,
+                    "live",
+                    Some(3_600),
+                    now
+                )
+                .await
+            );
+            assert!(
+                !cache(
+                    &database,
+                    &group,
+                    &channel,
+                    &author,
+                    "gone",
+                    Some(1),
+                    now - 120
+                )
+                .await
+            );
+
+            let stored = query_rumors(&database, &channel, None, 10)
+                .await
+                .expect("queries");
+            assert_eq!(stored.len(), 1);
+            assert_eq!(stored[0].content, "live");
+
+            // Hiding is not disappearing: the sweep removes the row itself,
+            // judged on the rumor's own signed tag.
+            let purged = purge_expired(&database, &channel, Timestamp::from_secs(now + 7_200))
+                .await
+                .expect("sweeps");
+            assert_eq!(purged, 1);
+            assert!(
+                query_rumors(&database, &channel, None, 10)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("queries")
+                    .is_empty()
+            );
+
+            // An untimed rumor is never swept, whatever the clock says.
+            assert!(cache(&database, &group, &channel, &author, "timeless", None, now).await);
+            let purged = purge_expired(&database, &channel, Timestamp::from_secs(now + 86_400))
+                .await
+                .expect("sweeps");
+            assert_eq!(purged, 0);
+        });
+    }
+
+    async fn cache(
+        database: &MemoryDatabase,
+        group: &GroupKey,
+        channel: &ChannelId,
+        author: &Keys,
+        content: &str,
+        timer: Option<u64>,
+        at_secs: u64,
+    ) -> bool {
+        let rumor = build_message(
+            author.public_key(),
+            channel,
+            Epoch(0),
+            content,
+            None,
+            at_secs * 1_000,
+            timer,
+        );
+        let (wrap, _) = seal_rumor(&rumor, group, author, false).expect("seals");
+        let opened = open_wrap(&wrap, group).expect("opens");
+
+        cache_rumor(database, channel, &opened)
+            .await
+            .expect("caches")
+    }
+}

crates/concord/src/stream.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,700 @@
+use std::fmt;
+
+use data_encoding::BASE64;
+use nostr::nips::nip44::v2::{ConversationKey, decrypt_to_bytes, encrypt_to_bytes_with_nonce};
+use nostr_sdk::prelude::{
+    Event, EventBuilder, EventId, FinalizeEvent, Keys, Kind, PublicKey, Tag, Timestamp,
+    UnsignedEvent,
+};
+
+use crate::derive::GroupKey;
+use crate::{ChannelId, Epoch};
+
+pub const KIND_WRAP: u16 = 1059;
+pub const KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL: u16 = 21059;
+pub const KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED: u16 = 20013;
+pub const KIND_SEAL_PLAINTEXT: u16 = 20014;
+pub const NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT: usize = 65_535;
+
+const TAG_MS: &str = "ms";
+const TAG_CHANNEL: &str = "channel";
+const TAG_EPOCH: &str = "epoch";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SealForm {
+    Encrypted,
+    Plaintext,
+}
+
+impl SealForm {
+    pub fn kind(self) -> u16 {
+        match self {
+            SealForm::Encrypted => KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED,
+            SealForm::Plaintext => KIND_SEAL_PLAINTEXT,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn from_kind(kind: u16) -> Option<Self> {
+        match kind {
+            KIND_SEAL_ENCRYPTED => Some(SealForm::Encrypted),
+            KIND_SEAL_PLAINTEXT => Some(SealForm::Plaintext),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum StreamError {
+    Sign(String),
+    Encrypt(String),
+    Decrypt(String),
+    Parse(String),
+    Oversize(usize),
+    BadWrapKind(u16),
+    WrongStream,
+    BadWrapSignature,
+    BadSealKind(u16),
+    BadSealSignature,
+    AuthorMismatch,
+    BadRumorId,
+    BadMs,
+    ChannelMismatch,
+    EpochMismatch,
+    MissingTag(&'static str),
+    DuplicateTag(&'static str),
+    NotRewrappable,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for StreamError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            StreamError::Sign(error) => write!(f, "sign: {error}"),
+            StreamError::Encrypt(error) => write!(f, "encrypt: {error}"),
+            StreamError::Decrypt(error) => write!(f, "decrypt: {error}"),
+            StreamError::Parse(error) => write!(f, "parse: {error}"),
+            StreamError::Oversize(len) => write!(f, "plaintext {len} bytes exceeds NIP-44 cap"),
+            StreamError::BadWrapKind(kind) => write!(f, "not a wrap kind: {kind}"),
+            StreamError::WrongStream => write!(f, "wrap author is not this stream"),
+            StreamError::BadWrapSignature => write!(f, "restricted wrap signature invalid"),
+            StreamError::BadSealKind(kind) => write!(f, "not a seal kind: {kind}"),
+            StreamError::BadSealSignature => write!(f, "seal signature invalid"),
+            StreamError::AuthorMismatch => write!(f, "rumor pubkey != seal pubkey"),
+            StreamError::BadRumorId => write!(f, "rumor id != computed hash"),
+            StreamError::BadMs => write!(f, "ms is not a canonical decimal in 0..=999"),
+            StreamError::ChannelMismatch => write!(f, "channel binding mismatch"),
+            StreamError::EpochMismatch => write!(f, "epoch binding mismatch"),
+            StreamError::MissingTag(name) => write!(f, "missing rumor tag: {name}"),
+            StreamError::DuplicateTag(name) => write!(f, "duplicate rumor tag: {name}"),
+            StreamError::NotRewrappable => write!(f, "only plaintext seals survive re-wrapping"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for StreamError {}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct OpenedStream {
+    pub rumor_id: EventId,
+    pub author: PublicKey,
+    pub seal_form: SealForm,
+    pub seal: Event,
+    pub wrapper_id: EventId,
+    pub at_ms: u64,
+    pub rumor: UnsignedEvent,
+}
+
+pub fn split_ms(at_ms: u64) -> (u64, u16) {
+    (at_ms / 1000, (at_ms % 1000) as u16)
+}
+
+/// Build a rumor carrying a full epoch-ms time: seconds in `created_at`, the remainder as `["ms", 0..=999]`.
+pub fn build_rumor_ms(
+    kind: u16,
+    author: PublicKey,
+    content: &str,
+    mut tags: Vec<Tag>,
+    at_ms: u64,
+) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    let (seconds, offset) = split_ms(at_ms);
+    tags.push(Tag::custom(TAG_MS, [offset.to_string()]));
+    build_rumor_secs(kind, author, content, tags, seconds)
+}
+
+/// Build a rumor with a plain seconds timestamp and no `ms` tag.
+pub fn build_rumor_secs(
+    kind: u16,
+    author: PublicKey,
+    content: &str,
+    tags: Vec<Tag>,
+    at_secs: u64,
+) -> UnsignedEvent {
+    let mut rumor = UnsignedEvent::new(
+        author,
+        Timestamp::from_secs(at_secs),
+        Kind::Custom(kind),
+        tags,
+        content,
+    );
+    rumor.ensure_id();
+    rumor
+}
+
+pub fn resolve_ms_strict(rumor: &UnsignedEvent) -> Result<u64, StreamError> {
+    let seconds = rumor.created_at.as_secs().saturating_mul(1000);
+    let mut tag: Option<Option<String>> = None;
+
+    for candidate in rumor.tags.iter() {
+        let fields = candidate.as_slice();
+        if fields.first().map(String::as_str) == Some(TAG_MS) {
+            tag = Some(fields.get(1).cloned());
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    let Some(raw) = tag else {
+        return Ok(seconds);
+    };
+    let raw = raw.ok_or(StreamError::BadMs)?;
+
+    if raw.is_empty() || !raw.bytes().all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit()) {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadMs);
+    }
+
+    let offset: u64 = raw.parse().map_err(|_| StreamError::BadMs)?;
+
+    if offset > 999 || (raw.len() > 1 && raw.starts_with('0')) {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadMs);
+    }
+
+    Ok(seconds.saturating_add(offset))
+}
+
+pub fn seal_content(
+    rumor: &UnsignedEvent,
+    form: SealForm,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+) -> Result<String, StreamError> {
+    let json = rumor.as_json();
+    check_plaintext_cap(json.len())?;
+
+    match form {
+        SealForm::Plaintext => Ok(json),
+        SealForm::Encrypted => seal_bytes(group.conversation(), json.as_bytes()),
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn seal_bytes(conversation: &ConversationKey, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<String, StreamError> {
+    check_plaintext_cap(plaintext.len())?;
+    Ok(BASE64.encode(&encrypt(conversation, plaintext)?))
+}
+
+pub fn open_bytes(conversation: &ConversationKey, content: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, StreamError> {
+    let payload = BASE64
+        .decode(content.as_bytes())
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Decrypt(error.to_string()))?;
+
+    decrypt_to_bytes(conversation, &payload)
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Decrypt(error.to_string()))
+}
+
+/// A member's own document (the Community List, the Invite List): NIP-44 to self.
+pub fn seal_to_self(keys: &Keys, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<String, StreamError> {
+    seal_bytes(
+        &ConversationKey::derive(keys.secret_key(), &keys.public_key())
+            .map_err(|error| StreamError::Encrypt(error.to_string()))?,
+        plaintext,
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn open_to_self(keys: &Keys, content: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, StreamError> {
+    open_bytes(
+        &ConversationKey::derive(keys.secret_key(), &keys.public_key())
+            .map_err(|error| StreamError::Decrypt(error.to_string()))?,
+        content,
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn build_seal(
+    rumor: &UnsignedEvent,
+    form: SealForm,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    author: &Keys,
+) -> Result<Event, StreamError> {
+    let content = seal_content(rumor, form, group)?;
+    EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(form.kind()), content)
+        .custom_created_at(rumor.created_at)
+        .finalize(author)
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Sign(error.to_string()))
+}
+
+pub fn wrap_seal(
+    seal: &Event,
+    group: &GroupKey,
+    wrap_kind: u16,
+    at: Timestamp,
+    extra: &[Tag],
+) -> Result<(Event, Keys), StreamError> {
+    wrap_seal_with(
+        seal,
+        group.conversation(),
+        group.keys(),
+        wrap_kind,
+        at,
+        extra,
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn wrap_seal_with(
+    seal: &Event,
+    conversation: &ConversationKey,
+    signer: &Keys,
+    wrap_kind: u16,
+    at: Timestamp,
+    extra: &[Tag],
+) -> Result<(Event, Keys), StreamError> {
+    if wrap_kind != KIND_WRAP && wrap_kind != KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadWrapKind(wrap_kind));
+    }
+
+    let json = seal.as_json();
+    check_plaintext_cap(json.len())?;
+
+    let content = BASE64.encode(&encrypt(conversation, json.as_bytes())?);
+    let ephemeral = Keys::generate();
+
+    let mut tags = vec![Tag::public_key(ephemeral.public_key())];
+    tags.extend_from_slice(extra);
+
+    let wrap = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(wrap_kind), content)
+        .tags(tags)
+        .custom_created_at(at)
+        .finalize(signer)
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Sign(error.to_string()))?;
+
+    Ok((wrap, ephemeral))
+}
+
+pub fn rewrap_seal(
+    seal: &Event,
+    read: &GroupKey,
+    signer: &GroupKey,
+    at: Timestamp,
+) -> Result<(Event, Keys), StreamError> {
+    if seal.kind.as_u16() != KIND_SEAL_PLAINTEXT {
+        return Err(StreamError::NotRewrappable);
+    }
+
+    wrap_seal_with(seal, read.conversation(), signer.keys(), KIND_WRAP, at, &[])
+}
+
+pub fn open_wrap(wrap: &Event, group: &GroupKey) -> Result<OpenedStream, StreamError> {
+    open_wrap_at(wrap, &group.pk(), group.conversation(), false)
+}
+
+pub fn open_wrap_at(
+    wrap: &Event,
+    address: &PublicKey,
+    conversation: &ConversationKey,
+    verify_wrap_signature: bool,
+) -> Result<OpenedStream, StreamError> {
+    let wrap_kind = wrap.kind.as_u16();
+
+    if wrap_kind != KIND_WRAP && wrap_kind != KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadWrapKind(wrap_kind));
+    }
+
+    if wrap.pubkey != *address {
+        return Err(StreamError::WrongStream);
+    }
+
+    if verify_wrap_signature && wrap.verify().is_err() {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadWrapSignature);
+    }
+
+    let seal: Event = Event::from_json(decode_content(conversation, &wrap.content)?)
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Parse(error.to_string()))?;
+    let seal_kind = seal.kind.as_u16();
+    let seal_form = SealForm::from_kind(seal_kind).ok_or(StreamError::BadSealKind(seal_kind))?;
+    seal.verify().map_err(|_| StreamError::BadSealSignature)?;
+
+    let rumor_json = match seal_form {
+        SealForm::Plaintext => seal.content.clone(),
+        SealForm::Encrypted => decode_content(conversation, &seal.content)?,
+    };
+
+    let mut rumor: UnsignedEvent = UnsignedEvent::from_json(rumor_json.as_bytes())
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Parse(error.to_string()))?;
+
+    if rumor.pubkey != seal.pubkey {
+        return Err(StreamError::AuthorMismatch);
+    }
+
+    let computed = rumor.compute_id();
+    if let Some(claimed) = rumor.id
+        && claimed != computed
+    {
+        return Err(StreamError::BadRumorId);
+    }
+    rumor.id = Some(computed);
+
+    let at_ms = resolve_ms_strict(&rumor)?;
+
+    Ok(OpenedStream {
+        rumor_id: computed,
+        author: seal.pubkey,
+        seal_form,
+        seal,
+        wrapper_id: wrap.id,
+        at_ms,
+        rumor,
+    })
+}
+
+pub fn channel_binding_tags(channel: &ChannelId, epoch: Epoch) -> Vec<Tag> {
+    vec![
+        Tag::custom(TAG_CHANNEL, [channel.to_hex()]),
+        Tag::custom(TAG_EPOCH, [epoch.0.to_string()]),
+    ]
+}
+
+pub fn check_channel_binding(
+    rumor: &UnsignedEvent,
+    channel: &ChannelId,
+    epoch: Epoch,
+) -> Result<(), StreamError> {
+    match unique_tag(rumor, TAG_CHANNEL)? {
+        Some(value) if value == channel.to_hex() => {}
+        Some(_) => return Err(StreamError::ChannelMismatch),
+        None => return Err(StreamError::MissingTag(TAG_CHANNEL)),
+    }
+
+    match unique_tag(rumor, TAG_EPOCH)? {
+        Some(value) if value == epoch.0.to_string() => {}
+        Some(_) => return Err(StreamError::EpochMismatch),
+        None => return Err(StreamError::MissingTag(TAG_EPOCH)),
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn encrypt(conversation: &ConversationKey, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, StreamError> {
+    let mut nonce = [0u8; 32];
+
+    crate::fill_random(&mut nonce).map_err(|error| StreamError::Encrypt(error.to_string()))?;
+
+    encrypt_to_bytes_with_nonce(conversation, plaintext, nonce)
+        .map_err(|error| StreamError::Encrypt(error.to_string()))
+}
+
+fn decode_content(conversation: &ConversationKey, content: &str) -> Result<String, StreamError> {
+    let plaintext = open_bytes(conversation, content)?;
+
+    String::from_utf8(plaintext).map_err(|error| StreamError::Parse(error.to_string()))
+}
+
+fn check_plaintext_cap(len: usize) -> Result<(), StreamError> {
+    if len > NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT {
+        return Err(StreamError::Oversize(len));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn unique_tag(rumor: &UnsignedEvent, name: &'static str) -> Result<Option<String>, StreamError> {
+    let mut found: Option<String> = None;
+
+    for tag in rumor.tags.iter() {
+        let fields = tag.as_slice();
+        if fields.len() >= 2 && fields[0] == name {
+            if found.is_some() {
+                return Err(StreamError::DuplicateTag(name));
+            }
+            found = Some(fields[1].clone());
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(found)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::derive::channel_group_key;
+
+    const SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x07u8; 32];
+    const OTHER_SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x08u8; 32];
+
+    fn channel() -> ChannelId {
+        ChannelId::from_bytes([0xabu8; 32])
+    }
+
+    fn group(epoch: u64) -> GroupKey {
+        channel_group_key(&SECRET, &channel(), Epoch(epoch)).expect("derives")
+    }
+
+    fn wrapper_p_tag(wrap: &Event) -> Option<String> {
+        wrap.tags
+            .iter()
+            .find(|tag| tag.as_slice().first().map(String::as_str) == Some("p"))
+            .and_then(|tag| tag.as_slice().get(1).cloned())
+    }
+
+    fn bound_rumor(content: &str, author: PublicKey, at_ms: u64) -> UnsignedEvent {
+        build_rumor_ms(
+            9,
+            author,
+            content,
+            channel_binding_tags(&channel(), Epoch(0)),
+            at_ms,
+        )
+    }
+
+    fn sealed(rumor: &UnsignedEvent, form: SealForm, author: &Keys) -> Event {
+        build_seal(rumor, form, &group(0), author).expect("seals")
+    }
+
+    fn wrapped(seal: &Event, kind: u16, at_secs: u64) -> Event {
+        wrap_seal(seal, &group(0), kind, Timestamp::from_secs(at_secs), &[])
+            .expect("wraps")
+            .0
+    }
+
+    fn encrypted_wrap(content: &str, author: &Keys, at_ms: u64, kind: u16) -> Event {
+        let rumor = bound_rumor(content, author.public_key(), at_ms);
+        wrapped(
+            &sealed(&rumor, SealForm::Encrypted, author),
+            kind,
+            at_ms / 1000,
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn both_seal_forms_round_trip() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let at_ms = 1_686_840_217_417;
+        let wrap = encrypted_wrap("Hey chat!", &author, at_ms, KIND_WRAP);
+
+        assert_eq!(wrap.kind, Kind::GiftWrap, "the durable wrap is kind 1059");
+        assert_eq!(wrap.pubkey, group(0).pk(), "the stream key signs the wrap");
+
+        let opened = open_wrap(&wrap, &group(0)).expect("opens");
+        assert_eq!(opened.author, author.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(opened.rumor.content, "Hey chat!");
+        assert_eq!(opened.rumor_id, opened.rumor.id.expect("id is set"));
+        assert_eq!(opened.wrapper_id, wrap.id);
+        assert_eq!(opened.at_ms, at_ms);
+        assert_eq!(opened.seal_form, SealForm::Encrypted);
+        check_channel_binding(&opened.rumor, &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("binding holds");
+
+        // The wrap's `p` tag must identify neither the stream nor the author.
+        let p = wrapper_p_tag(&wrap).expect("the wrap carries a p tag");
+        assert_ne!(p, group(0).pk_hex());
+        assert_ne!(p, author.public_key().to_hex());
+
+        // Ephemeral actions ride the same structure at a kind relays must drop.
+        let typing = encrypted_wrap("typing", &author, 5_000, KIND_WRAP_EPHEMERAL);
+        assert_eq!(typing.kind.as_u16(), 21059);
+        assert_eq!(
+            open_wrap(&typing, &group(0)).expect("opens").rumor.content,
+            "typing"
+        );
+
+        // The plaintext form carries the rumor's bytes verbatim, which is what
+        // lets a compaction re-wrap the signed edition into a later epoch.
+        let edition = build_rumor_secs(
+            3308,
+            author.public_key(),
+            "an edition",
+            vec![],
+            1_700_000_000,
+        );
+        let seal = sealed(&edition, SealForm::Plaintext, &author);
+        assert_eq!(seal.content, edition.as_json(), "the rumor rides verbatim");
+
+        let opened = open_wrap(&wrapped(&seal, KIND_WRAP, 1), &group(0)).expect("opens");
+        assert_eq!(opened.seal_form, SealForm::Plaintext);
+
+        let (rewrapped, _) =
+            rewrap_seal(&opened.seal, &group(1), &group(1), Timestamp::from_secs(2))
+                .expect("rewraps");
+        let reopened = open_wrap(&rewrapped, &group(1)).expect("opens");
+        assert_eq!(reopened.rumor_id, opened.rumor_id, "the rumor id survives");
+        assert_eq!(reopened.author, author.public_key());
+        assert_eq!(
+            reopened.seal.sig, opened.seal.sig,
+            "the signature rides whole"
+        );
+        assert_ne!(reopened.wrapper_id, opened.wrapper_id);
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            rewrap_seal(
+                &sealed(&edition, SealForm::Encrypted, &author),
+                &group(1),
+                &group(1),
+                Timestamp::from_secs(2)
+            ),
+            Err(StreamError::NotRewrappable)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hostile_wraps_are_dropped_in_order() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+        let impostor = Keys::generate();
+
+        // Kind and address are settled before any decryption is attempted.
+        let mut wrong_kind = encrypted_wrap("x", &author, 1_000, KIND_WRAP);
+        wrong_kind.kind = Kind::Custom(1058);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&wrong_kind, &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::BadWrapKind(1058))
+        ));
+
+        let foreign = channel_group_key(&OTHER_SECRET, &channel(), Epoch(0)).expect("derives");
+        let wrap = encrypted_wrap("x", &author, 1_000, KIND_WRAP);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&wrap, &foreign),
+            Err(StreamError::WrongStream)
+        ));
+
+        // A flipped ciphertext byte fails the NIP-44 MAC.
+        let mut payload = BASE64
+            .decode(wrap.content.as_bytes())
+            .expect("content is base64");
+        payload[40] ^= 0x01;
+        let mut tampered = wrap.clone();
+        tampered.content = BASE64.encode(&payload);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&tampered, &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::Decrypt(_))
+        ));
+
+        // A seal claiming an author it holds no signature for.
+        let seal = sealed(
+            &bound_rumor("spoof", author.public_key(), 1_000),
+            SealForm::Encrypted,
+            &impostor,
+        );
+        let mut swapped: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&seal.as_json()).expect("json");
+        swapped["pubkey"] = serde_json::Value::String(author.public_key().to_hex());
+        let seal = Event::from_json(swapped.to_string()).expect("a swapped pubkey still parses");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&wrapped(&seal, KIND_WRAP, 1), &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::BadSealSignature)
+        ));
+
+        // A seal that does not vouch for the rumor's author.
+        let seal = sealed(
+            &bound_rumor("spoof", impostor.public_key(), 1_000),
+            SealForm::Encrypted,
+            &author,
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&wrapped(&seal, KIND_WRAP, 1), &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::AuthorMismatch)
+        ));
+
+        // A claimed id the rumor's own bytes do not hash to. The plaintext seal
+        // smuggles the forgery through verbatim.
+        let rumor = bound_rumor("real", author.public_key(), 1_000);
+        let mut forged: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&rumor.as_json()).expect("json");
+        forged["id"] = serde_json::Value::String("00".repeat(32));
+        let seal = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_SEAL_PLAINTEXT), forged.to_string())
+            .custom_created_at(rumor.created_at)
+            .finalize(&author)
+            .expect("seals");
+        assert!(matches!(
+            open_wrap(&wrapped(&seal, KIND_WRAP, 1), &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::BadRumorId)
+        ));
+
+        // Binding splices: another channel, another epoch, a duplicate or none.
+        let doubled = vec![channel_binding_tags(&channel(), Epoch(0)); 2].concat();
+        let rumor = bound_rumor("x", author.public_key(), 1_000);
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            check_channel_binding(&rumor, &ChannelId::from_bytes([0xcdu8; 32]), Epoch(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::ChannelMismatch)
+        ));
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            check_channel_binding(&rumor, &channel(), Epoch(1)),
+            Err(StreamError::EpochMismatch)
+        ));
+
+        let duplicate = build_rumor_ms(9, author.public_key(), "x", doubled, 1_000);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            check_channel_binding(&duplicate, &channel(), Epoch(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::DuplicateTag(_))
+        ));
+
+        let unbound = build_rumor_ms(9, author.public_key(), "x", vec![], 1_000);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            check_channel_binding(&unbound, &channel(), Epoch(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::MissingTag(_))
+        ));
+
+        let oversize = build_rumor_ms(
+            9,
+            author.public_key(),
+            &"x".repeat(NIP44_MAX_PLAINTEXT + 1),
+            vec![],
+            1_000,
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            seal_content(&oversize, SealForm::Encrypted, &group(0)),
+            Err(StreamError::Oversize(_))
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ms_is_a_drop_gate() {
+        let author = Keys::generate();
+
+        let absent = build_rumor_secs(9, author.public_key(), "x", vec![], 1_000);
+        assert_eq!(resolve_ms_strict(&absent).expect("resolves"), 1_000_000);
+
+        let highest = build_rumor_ms(9, author.public_key(), "x", vec![], 1_000_999);
+        assert_eq!(resolve_ms_strict(&highest).expect("resolves"), 1_000_999);
+
+        for malformed in ["1000", "007", "abc", "+5", ""] {
+            let rumor = build_rumor_secs(
+                9,
+                author.public_key(),
+                "x",
+                vec![Tag::custom(TAG_MS, [malformed.to_string()])],
+                1_000,
+            );
+            assert!(
+                matches!(resolve_ms_strict(&rumor), Err(StreamError::BadMs)),
+                "{malformed:?} must be malformed"
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Present but valueless is malformed, not an offset-0 default.
+        let valueless = build_rumor_secs(
+            9,
+            author.public_key(),
+            "x",
+            vec![Tag::custom(TAG_MS, Vec::<String>::new())],
+            1_000,
+        );
+        assert!(matches!(
+            resolve_ms_strict(&valueless),
+            Err(StreamError::BadMs)
+        ));
+
+        // A valued duplicate takes the first, matching Armada.
+        let repeated = build_rumor_secs(
+            9,
+            author.public_key(),
+            "x",
+            vec![
+                Tag::custom(TAG_MS, ["1".to_string()]),
+                Tag::custom(TAG_MS, ["2".to_string()]),
+            ],
+            1_000,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(resolve_ms_strict(&repeated).expect("resolves"), 1_000_001);
+    }
+}